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Abstract
Does capital-embodied technological change play an important role in shaping labor
market inequalities? This paper addresses the question in a model with vintage capital
and search/matching frictions where costly capital investment leads to large hetero-
geneity in productivity among vacancies in equilibrium. The paper ﬁrst demonstrates
analytically how both technology growth and institutional variables aﬀect equilibrium
wage inequality, income shares and unemployment. Next, it applies the model to a
quantitative evaluation of capital as an origin of wage inequality: at the current rate of
embodied productivity growth a 10-year vintage diﬀerential in capital translates into
a 6% wage gap. The model also allows a U.S.–continental Europe comparison: an
embodied technological acceleration interacted with diﬀerent labor market institutions
can explain a signiﬁcant part of the diﬀerential rise in unemployment and capital share
and some of the diﬀerential dynamics in wage inequality.
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01I n t r o d u c t i o n
Recently, we have witnessed striking changes in the technology used in the workplace. The
“new economy” can arguably be characterized as follows: (i) technological improvements
seem to be intimately connected with the introduction of new capital goods and (ii) these
improvements proceed at a faster rate than before. Over the past two decades the produc-
tivity gains associated with new investment have represented the major source of growth in
U.S. output per capita (Jorgenson 2001).
The fact that new technologies are “embodied” in capital opens the possibility of large
discrepancies in worker productivity, both within and between ﬁrms. In this paper we
argue that unless labor markets are perfectly competitive–so that identical workers are
paid the same wage, independently of the capital they work with–rapid, capital-embodied
technological change can be an important determinant of wage inequality. In addition, to
the extent that there are frictions in matching capital to labor and that there are rents to be
divided between them, the rate of unemployment and the income shares–other important
aspects of inequality–can also be aﬀected by technological progress.
Our analysis rests on a general-equilibrium framework with three building blocks: vintage
capital, a frictional labor market, and wage bargaining. To model capital-embodied techno-
logical change we use a vintage capital framework where machines/jobs are costly-to-create
units of capital of diﬀerent ages, corresponding to technologies with diﬀerent productivity
levels. To model employment inequalities, we operate in the tradition of Diamond/Mortensen
and Pissarides-style models, where an aggregate matching function determines the meeting
rate between unemployed workers and vacant jobs. To model wage inequality and the divi-
sion of income between labor and capital, we follow the standard approach in this literature
whereby wages and proﬁts are endogenously determined through Nash bargaining within the
worker-ﬁrm pair. We show the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium in our model and
analyze how inequalities in the labor market are determined as a function of the economy’s
primitives: technology, frictions, and institutions. In particular, we study the role of the
rate of technological change itself and its interaction with economic policy in the form of
government intervention in the labor market.
We use our theory of labor market inequality implied by capital-embodied technological
change to provide quantitative answers to two substantive questions. First, we use a cali-
1brated version of the model to account for the contribution of vintage capital to observed
wage inequality: how much of “residual” wage inequality, that is, inequality that cannot
be attributed to observable characteristics of workers, might be due to diﬀerences in capi-
tal? Quantitative theory is useful here because we believe that it is very diﬃcult to identify
relative machine quality in the data; data on the age of capital is diﬃcult to link to wage
inequality, and ﬁrm or plant age are very crude and indirect measures; more disaggregated
data is simply not available.1
The other question we take on is perhaps more ambitious. Over the past thirty years la-
bor market outcomes in the United States and continental European countries have changed
substantially and in very diﬀerent ways. In the United States wage inequality jumped to
the highest levels in the postwar period, the labor share of income declined slightly, and
the unemployment rate remained remarkably stable. In sharp contrast, in most of the large
continental European economies, the wage structure did not change much at all, while the
labor share fell substantially and unemployment increased steadily. Over the very same
period, impressive technological improvements embodied in new vintages of capital (espe-
cially in information and communication equipment and software) induced the adoption of
new production technologies across virtually every developed economy. Can these facts be
accounted for with our theory of capital-embodied technological change and labor market
frictions? We study, in particular, whether the interaction between this growth channel and
certain labor market institutions, whose strength diﬀers between US and Europe, can explain
quantitatively the diﬀerent evolution of the various dimensions of labor market inequalities.
THE FACTS:
In Table 1 we report some key numbers on unemployment rate, wage inequality, and
labor shares for several OECD countries at ﬁve-year intervals from 1965 to 1995. We are
particularly interested in the comparison between United States and continental European
countries (averaged in the row labelled Europe Average).2
In 1965 the unemployment rate in virtually every European country was lower than in
the United States. Thirty years later, the opposite was true: the U.S. unemployment rate
1Any systematic relation between wages and capital quality in the data would also be hard to interpret,
since workers’ unobservable characteristics are likely to be correlated with the capital they are matched with
(e.g., one might expect some degree of positive sorting).
2For completeness, we include data in Table 1 for the UK and Canada, whose behavior falls somewhere
between that of the United States and Europe.
2rose by 1.7% from 1965-1995, whereas the average rise for European countries is 8.4%. The
labor share of aggregate income has declined only marginally in the United States, by 1.5%
from 1965-1995, while on average it fell by almost 6 points in Europe. Wage inequality,
measured by the percentage diﬀerential between the ninth and the ﬁrst earnings deciles for
male workers, rose only slightly in Europe by 4% in the past 15 years, and it even declined
in some countries (Belgium, Germany, and Norway). The sharp surge of earnings inequality
in the United States is well documented, see Katz and Autor 1999, and the OECD data
conﬁrm a rise of almost 30% since 1980. Interestingly, the European averages hide much less
cross-country variation than one would expect given the raw nature of the comparison. For
example, in 11 out of the 14 continental European countries, the increase in unemployment
r a t eh a sb e e nl a r g e rt h a n6 % ,a n di n9o u to f1 4c ountries the decline in the labor share has
been greater than 5%.
THE QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS:
Aghion and Howitt (1994) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) pioneered the research
on the relation between embodied productivity growth and unemployment in a frictional
labor market.3 In their standard models new capital is always costless to buy and, as a
result, vacancies all consist of the newest capital. In contrast, the key new feature of our
model is the existence of vacancy heterogeneity, i.e., vacancies diﬀer with respect to the
quality of the equipment on the job. This new feature is important for two reasons.
First, in the standard model the vintage structure is purely a frictional phenomenon:
when the capital is matched with a worker, it ages until a break-up results from the capital
becoming too obsolete relative to the worker’s outside option. As matching becomes more
and more instantaneous–as the friction is made weaker–separation occurs earlier and ear-
lier; in the limit, with no matching friction, all capital is new, so vintage eﬀects are absent.4
Although our analysis has several features inc o m m o nw i t ht h e s es t u d i e s ,w em o d e lc a p i t a l
3Jovanovic (1998) investigates analytically the relation between embodied productivity growth and wage
inequality in a competitive assignment model with a continuum of vintages of capital and of types of workers.
Our introduction of frictions in the labor market allows a study of unemployment and induces a diﬀerent wage
determination mechanism with speciﬁc implications for wage inequality. Interestingly, some key mechanisms
of the frictionless economy carry over to the frictional model, as will become clear below.
4Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) present also a model where ﬁrms can upgrade their capital without
necessarily inducing the destruction of the match. Because upgrading the existing machine is costly, while
destroying the job and opening a vacancy with the new capital entails only the search costs, it remains true
that as the frictions disappear, so does the vintage structure. We return on the upgrading issue later in the
paper.
3diﬀerently. We view capital as costly to buy, and once capital has been purchased, it is
natural to use it until it is so obsolete that the workers are more eﬃciently used elsewhere–
since they can alternatively work with newer capital. Thus, a unit of capital has a natural
life-cycle. Labor market frictions will make the life of capital longer because it is not costless
for a worker to ﬁnd new capital to work with–she may have to go through an unproductive
period of unemployment. In contrast to the existing literature, in the frictionless version of
our model, capital is used for a strictly positive time period before being scrapped. In this
sense, our model is the most natural extension of the standard competitive vintage capital
growth model (Solow 1960) to an econom yw i t hl a b o rm a r k e tf r i c t i o n s .
Second, the presence of a nontrivial distribution of vacancies introduces new economic
forces in the standard model of equilibrium unemployment. First, the existence of a nonzero
outside option for the ﬁrm reduces the match surplus proportionally to the ﬁrm’s meeting
rate. Thus, changes in the embodied productivity growth rate, which have an impact on
the equilibrium meeting rates, will aﬀect the surplus through this new channel. In addi-
tion, changes in the rate of technical progress will aﬀect the equilibrium age distribution of
vacancies and, through this channel, the worker’s outside option of searching.
The main result of our qualitative analysis is that, notwithstanding the increased com-
plexity that this heterogeneity introduces, we show that it is possible to maintain analytical
tractability in characterizing the chief features of an equilibrium. In particular, we can repre-
sent the equilibrium of the economy with two curv e s( j o bc r e a t i o nc u r v ea n dj o bd e s t r u c t i o n
curve) in the two-dimensional space deﬁned by the age of capital at destruction and the
l a b o rm a r k e tt i g h t n e s s .T h es h i f t so ft h et w oc urves following a permanent rise in the rate
of embodied productivity are unambiguous, which allows us to describe qualitatively the
response of unemployment, inequality, and income shares. We show in particular that an
economy with generous unemployment beneﬁts is more likely to respond to such a faster
productivity growth rate with a rise in unemployment duration, while a laissez-faire type
economy is more prone to respond through a reduction in the life-length of capital and more
job separations.
The intuition for this result is intimately related to the new features of our model: when
capital is costly, there exists a minimum life-length of the job required to fully recover the set-
up cost even in the absence of frictions. A U.S.-type economy with a minimal welfare state
has low labor costs and, hence, “bad” jobs with very old capital are still proﬁtable, so that
4the optimal scrapping age of capital is relatively high and far away from the technological
minimum. In contrast, in a European-type economy with muniﬁcent welfare payments, ﬁrms
are forced to scrap old capital earlier. An increase in the productivity of capital is in essence
an “obsolescence” shock to which ﬁrms would like to respond by shortening the life of capital
and adopting the new vintages more quickly. However, while this is possible in a U.S.-type
economy, such margin of adjustment is not fully available to European-type economies, whose
life of capital is already very close to the technological minimum. Since the scrapping age
cannot decline enough, ﬁrms need to be compensated through a diﬀerent margin–a higher
meeting probability–which translates into longer unemployment durations for workers. This
mechanism improves the bargaining power of ﬁrms and allows them to push workers closer
to their outside option (which is constant across workers). The consequence is a larger fall in
the labor share of output and a smaller rise in wage inequality in European-type economies.
This qualitative analysis is one of the keys to deciphering the results of the quantitative
exercise.
THE QUANTITATIVE EXERCISES:
The quantitative importance of capital-embodied technological change for residual wage
inequality and unemployment has, as far as we know, not been studied before. The diﬀerence
between the labor market experiences of the United States and continental Europe, however,
has been the object of a quantitative analysis in a number of papers.5 The divergent behavior
of the two economies is explained in these papers through the interaction between diﬀerent
labor market institutions across regions and a common structural shock to the economic
environment. In our view, the existing literature does not oﬀer a satisfactory way to link the
fundamental driving force behind the changes in the labor market to independent observable
data. As a consequence, any calibration attempt matches one of the crucial elements of
interest, such as the rise in inequality or the changes in income shares, by construction. We
take the view that unemployment, inequality, and changes in the labor income share are
of great importance and have to be explained jointly: they are dimensions along which the
model should be evaluated rather than calibrated. An important advantage of our model
is that the unique source of the shock is capital-embodied productivity, and the parameter
regulating the speed of capital-embodied technological change can be measured through
independent data–the change in the quality-adjusted relative price of equipment–as is done
5We summarize this literature in section 5.4.
5in a number of previous papers that have applied this information to growth accounting and
analyses of the labor market.6
The model suggests that vintage capital has a signiﬁcant impact on wage inequality,
although the implied level of wage inequality is small compared to the data in Table 1. This
result is not surprising, as the only source of wage diﬀerentials in our economy is vintage
capital within an ex ante equal set of workers. Because of the lack of detailed employer-
employee matched data where one could sharply distinguish the role of workers’ individual
characteristics from the role of ﬁrms’ characteristics in wage determination, we are not aware
of any direct empirical estimate of the eﬀect of diﬀerences in the vintage of capital on wage
diﬀerentials. We can, however, use our calibrated model to give an answer to this question:
we ﬁnd that in a U.S.-type economy a diﬀerence of ten years in the vintage of capital used
by the ﬁrm generates wage diﬀerentials around 6%. We argue th a tt h i sr e p r e s e n t sa b o u to n e
fourth of residual wage inequality for ex-ante equal workers in the United States.
The quantitative U.S.—Europe exercise consists of an acceleration in the rate of embod-
ied productivity growth in economies that diﬀer according to the generosity of their welfare
beneﬁts and the strictness of employment protection legislation. The main result of our
quantitative exercise is that the model is successful in generating the observed diﬀerential
rise in unemployment and in the capital share between the United States and Europe. A
permanent rise in the rate of capital-embodied productivity growth of 2 percentage points
increases unemployment rate by less than 1 point in the U.S.-type economy and by over 8
points in the European-type economy, with all the increase taking place along the unem-
ployment duration margin, as in the data. The labor share falls by over 6 points in both
economies, but once we introduce a ﬁring tax to capture variations in the degree of employ-
ment protection, the model generates a stronger fall in the labor share (by circa 3 points) in
European-type economies with stricter ﬁring restrictions.
Finally, the numerical simulations show that our model with vacancy heterogeneity dis-
plays a quantitative amount of technology-policy complementarity much larger than that of
the standard Aghion-Howitt/Mortensen-Pissarides framework. We believe this complemen-
tarity helps in explaining the data.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we start our analysis
6See Gordon (1990), Hornstein and Krusell (1996), Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997), Greenwood
and Yorukoglu (1997), Krusell, Ohanian, R´ ıos-Rull, and Violante (2000), and Cummins and Violante (2002),
among others.
6with the frictionless environment, where workers are all paid the same wage and all are
employed. In Section 3 we move to the frictional environment with heterogeneous vacancies,
solve the model, and prove the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. In Section 4 we
characterize how equilibrium inequalities in employment, wages, and income shares respond
qualitatively to a change in the speed of embodied technology, and we also study the role
of diﬀerent labor market institutions in an attempt to explain the distinct labor market
performances of the United States and Europe. Section 5 presents the calibration of the
model and the results of our quantitative exercises and discusses the related literature in
detail. Section 5.5 compares our model with the standard matching model. Finally, Section
6 concludes the paper.
2 The frictionless economy
Time is continuous. The economy is populated by a stationary measure 1 of workers who
are all alike, live forever, are risk-neutral, and discount the future at rate r. Technological
progress is embodied in capital, and the productive capacity of new vintage machines grows
at the rate γ>0. A ﬁrm (or job, or production unit) can be created through an initial
investment expenditure I(t), and the cost of new vintage machines also grows at the rate γ.
Firms can freely enter the market upon payment of the initial installation cost. At time t,
ﬁrms can choose whether to purchase the newest vintage machine or a machine of any older
existing vintage: newer vintages are relatively more expensive to set up, but they are also
relatively more productive.
A ﬁrm is productive only when paired with a worker. There is no physical depreciation of
machines and production of a ﬁrm remains constant through its lifetime. There is, however,
economic depreciation. Older ﬁrms produce relatively less than newer ﬁrms because of
embodied technological change, and ﬁrms with old enough capital will voluntarily exit the
market.
In order to make the model stationary, we normalize all variables and deﬁne output
relative to the newest production unit. The normalized cost of a new production unit is
then constant at I, and the normalized output of a production unit of age a which is paired
with a worker is e−γa. We will focus on the steady state of the normalized economy, which
corresponds to a balanced growth path of the actual economy. Finally, we will assume that
r>γto guarantee the boundedness of inﬁnite sums.
7We start by describing the competitive equilibrium for the frictionless economy. In the
steady state the wage rate also grows at the rate γ and the normalized wage w ≤ 1, now
measured relative to the output of the newest vintage, is constant. Consider a price-taker
ﬁrm that plans to set up a new vintage machine. The ﬁrm optimally chooses the exit age ¯ a








where Π is the proﬁt function. Since ﬂow proﬁts are monotonically declining and eventually




stating that the price of labor has to equal the productivity of the oldest machine, which is
also the marginal productivity of labor. The higher the wage, the shorter the life-length of
capital since (normalized) proﬁts per period fall and thus reach zero sooner.
We next argue that proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms always choose the newest capital vintage.
Suppose the labor required to operate new vintage machines was also increasing in the
quality of machines at rate γ over time. Then ﬁrms would be indiﬀerent between the newest
and any older technology: an older vintage would simply scale down costs–both for the
machine and wage expenses–and revenues by the same amount, leaving proﬁts unchanged,
and the time in operation would remain at the same level as that for new ﬁrms. The labor
requirement, however, is not increasing over time, which is why new technologies are better;
in fact, technological change is labor-augmenting here in the sense that it allows one worker
to work with more and more eﬃciency units of capital over time by using newer and newer
equipment. Thus, a ﬁrm choosing to invest in old capital would, once in operation, generate
lower proﬁts per period, and it would operate for a shorter period of time (since the time
at which the wage equals the total product is reached sooner) than if it chose the newest
capital. The lower cost of the old machine would compensate these losses only partially.7
Free entry of ﬁrms requires that in equilibrium I = Π. This is the key condition that
determines exit age ¯ a, and hence wages. Using the proﬁt-maximization condition (1), the









7This argument is easy to verify mathematically, so we omit its proof in the text.
8Equation (2) allows us to discuss existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium as well as
comparative statics. It is straightforward to solve for eﬃcient allocations and show that
a stationary solution to the planner’s problem reproduces the competitive allocations (see
Appendix A.1).
The right-hand side of the equilibrium condition (2) is strictly increasing in the exit age
¯ a for two reasons. First, in an equilibrium with older ﬁrms, the relative productivity of the
marginal operating ﬁrm is lower and therefore wages have to be lower and proﬁts higher.
Second, a longer machine life increases the duration for which proﬁts are accumulated. The
right-hand side of (2) increases from 0 to 1/r as ¯ a goes from 0 to inﬁnity. Taken together,
these facts mean that there exists a unique steady state exit age ¯ aCE whenever I<1/r.
This condition is natural: unless you can recover the initial capital investment at zero wages
using an inﬁnite lifetime (
R ∞
0 e−rada =1 /r being the net proﬁt from such an operation),
it is not proﬁtable to start any ﬁrm. With a unit mass of workers, all employed, the ﬁrm
distribution is uniform with density 1/¯ aCE, which is also the measure of entrant ﬁrms ef.
Turning to comparative statics, we note that a larger interest rate r decreases present-
value proﬁts, thus lowering entry and increasing the life span of the machine. Conversely,
an increase in the cost of a new machine I will raise the life span: fewer machines enter and
they stay in operation longer to recover the ﬁxed cost. An increased growth rate of capital-
embodied technological change γ must decrease the life span of machines and increase the
number of ﬁrms that enter at each point in time. Formally, the right-hand side of equation
(2) is increasing in the growth rate γ: the higher the growth rate, the lower the relative
productivity of the least productive ﬁrm, and therefore the lower the cost of hiring labor
must be. Faster growth therefore means higher proﬁts, implying an increase in entry at
the expense of older machines that are forced to exit earlier. Thus, in the competitive
economy when technological change accelerates, the rate of job turnover in the economy
rises and, as a consequence of the decline in the wage rate, the labor share of aggregate
income ωCE = γ/
³
eγ¯ aCE − 1
´
falls.
Although the prediction on the income shares qualitatively matches the facts of Table
1, it is worth remarking that the environment without frictions displays neither wage nor
employment inequality, so it cannot serve as a tool to analyze the facts we described. For
this reason, we now turn our attention to an environment with matching frictions.
93 The economy with matching frictions
In this section, we consider a slightly diﬀerent economy. The demographics and the tech-
nological side of the model are unchanged, but the structure of the labor market is new.
The labor market is no longer perfectly competitive: it is frictional. The matching process
between workers and production units is random and takes place in one pool comprising
all workers and all vacant ﬁrms; vacant ﬁrms are distinguished by the age of their capital.
Throughout, and for tractability, we will focus on steady-state analysis; thus, the notation
presumes no time-dependence. In particular, all distributions are stationary over time.
The nature of the ﬁrm’s decision process–buy a piece of capital, then match with a
worker, and ﬁnally exit when the capital is so old that it no longer generates positive proﬁt
ﬂows–remains the same as in the frictionless economy. In particular, ﬁrms in this economy
will also choose to buy the newest form of capital when entering. Due to the matching
frictions, some ﬁrms will also become idle, but idle ﬁrms have no option but to wait until
they meet a worker.8
T h er a t ea tw h i c haw o r k e rm e e t saﬁrm with capital of age a is λw(a)a n dt h er a t ea t
which she meets any ﬁrm is λw ≡
R ¯ a
0 λw(a)da,w h e r e¯ a is the job-destruction age. A ﬁrm
meets a worker at the rate λf.L e t ν(a) denote the measure of vacant ﬁrms of age a.W e
assume that the number of matches in any moment is determined by a constant returns
to scale matching function m(v,u), where v ≡
R ¯ a
0 ν(a)da is the total number of vacancies
and u is the total number of unemployed workers. We also assume that m(v,u) is strictly
increasing in both arguments and satisﬁes some standard regularity conditions.9 Using the









8One can easily allow for an “upgrading” decision: in any given period, with some probability the ﬁrm
has an opportunity to upgrade the machine to the newest capital and keep the worker at some cost. In the











10The expression for the meeting probability in (4) provides a one-to-one (strictly decreasing)
mapping between λf and θ. Thereafter, when we discuss changes in λf, we imagine changes
in θ.
We assume that matches dissolve exogenously at the rate δ: upon dissolution, the worker
and the ﬁrm are thrown into the pool of searchers.10 Searching is costless: it only takes time.
When unemployed, the worker receives a welfare payment b. The measure of matches with
an a ﬁrm and a worker is denoted µ(a) and total employment µ.
Values for the market participants are J(a)a n dW(a)f o rm a t c h e dﬁrms and workers,
respectively, V (a)f o rv a c a n tﬁrms, and U for unemployed workers. Let w(a)d e n o t et h e
wage paid to a worker from an a ﬁrm. The values solve the following diﬀerential equation
system, which summarizes the ﬂow payoﬀso fw o r k e r sa n dﬁrms:
(r − γ)V (a)=m a x {λf [J(a) − V (a)] + V
0(a),0} (5)
(r − γ)J(a)=m a x {e
−γa − w(a) − δ[J(a) − V (a)] + J
0(a),(r − γ)V (a)} (6)
(r − γ)U = b +
Z ¯ a
0
λw(a)[W(a) − U]da (7)
(r − γ)W(a)=m a x {w(a) − δ[W(a) − U]+W
0(a),(r − γ)U}. (8)
The derivatives of the value functions with respect to a will be negative and are ﬂow losses
due to the aging of capital.11
In the presence of frictions, a bilateral monopoly problem between the ﬁrm and the worker
arises, and thus wages are not competitive. As is standard in the literature, we choose a
Nash bargaining solution for wages. With outside options as in the above equations, the
wage is such that at every instant a fraction β of the total surplus S (a)o fat y p ea match
goes to the worker and a fraction 1 − β goes to the ﬁrm:
S (a) ≡ J (a)+W (a) − V (a) − U (9)
W(a)=U + βS(a)a n dJ(a)=V (a)+( 1− β)S (a). (10)
T h ee x p l i c i ts o l u t i o nf o rt h ew a g ei sd i s c u s s ed in Section 4.2. Finally, we require that
V (0) = I so that there is no proﬁtable entry by ﬁrms with new capital in equilibrium.
10We omitted this event from the description of the competitive equilibrium because, without frictions,
it is immaterial to the ﬁrm whether the match dissolves exogenously or not as the worker can be replaced
instantaneously at no cost.
11In Appendix A.2 we describe a typical derivation of the diﬀerential equations above.
113.1 Solving the matching model
We characterize the equilibrium of the matching model in terms of two variables: the rate
at which vacant ﬁrms meet workers and the exit age: (¯ a,λf). The two variables are jointly
determined by two key conditions. The ﬁrst condition, labelled the job destruction condition,
expresses the indiﬀerence between carrying on and separating for a match with capital of age
¯ a. The second condition, labelled the job creation condition, expresses the indiﬀerence for
outside ﬁrms between creating a vacancy with the newest vintage and not entering. In the
next main section, Section 3.2, we then demonstrate that a solution to these two equations
exists and is unique.
In Section 3.1.1 we ﬁrst derive closed-form solutions of the system of equations (5)—
(10) that deﬁne the value/surplus functions. The speciﬁc solution for the surplus function
depends on the pair (¯ a,λf) and the unemployment value U. In Section 3.1.2 we apply the
results of Section 3.1.1 to the optimal separation decision and derive the job destruction
condition. The optimal separation decision does depend on the pair (¯ a,λf)a n dt h er a t e s
λw (a) at which unemployed workers are matched with ﬁrms. In Section 3.1.3 we apply the
results of Section 3.1.1 to the free entry requirement and derive the job creation condition
which depends only on the pair (¯ a,λf). In Section 3.1.4 we derive the rates λw (a)a tw h i c h
unemployed workers are matched with ﬁrms in terms of the pair (¯ a,λf).
3.1.1 The surplus function
In this class of models all decisions are surplus-maximizing. Thus, it is useful to start by
stating the (ﬂow version of the) surplus equation. Using (9) this equation can be described
by
(r − γ)S(a)=m a x {e
−γa − δS(a) − λf(1 − β)S(a) − (r − γ)U + S
0(a),0}. (11)
This asset-pricing-like equation is obtained by combining equations (5)-(10): the return on
surplus on the left-hand side equals the ﬂow gain on the right-hand side, where the ﬂow
gain is the maximum of zero and the ﬂow diﬀerence between total inside minus total outside
values. The inside value ﬂows include (i) a production ﬂow e−γa, (ii) a ﬂow loss due to the
probability of a separation of the match δS(a), and (iii) changes in the value for the matched
parties, J0(a)+W0(a). The outside option ﬂows are (i) the ﬂow gain from the chance that
a vacant ﬁrm matches λf(1 − β)S(a), (ii) the change in the value for the vacant ﬁrm V 0(a),
and (iii) the ﬂow value of unemployment (r − γ)U.








γ(˜ a−a)(r − γ)U
¤
d˜ a, (12)
where we have used the boundary condition associated with the fact that the surplus-
maximizing decision is to keep the match alive until an age ¯ a such that S(¯ a)=0 . For lower
a’s the match will have strictly positive surplus, and for values of a above ¯ a the surplus
will be equal to zero. Straightforward integration of the right-hand side in (12) and further
diﬀerentiation shows that, over the range [0,¯ a), the function S(a) is strictly decreasing and
convex; moreover, S(a) will approach 0 in such a manner that S0(¯ a)i sd e ﬁned and equals
zero. Intuitively, the surplus is decreasing in age a for two reasons: ﬁrst, the time-horizon
over which the ﬂow surplus accrues to the pair shortens with a; second, the outside option
of the worker rises over time at rate γ — the pace of productivity growth of the new vacant
jobs — while output is ﬁxed.
Equation (12) contains a non-standard term due to the vacancy heterogeneity: the
nonzero ﬁrm’s outside option of remaining vacant with its machine reduces the surplus by
increasing the “eﬀective” discount factor through the term (1 − β)λf. Everything else being
equal, the quasi-rents in the match are decreasing as the bargaining power of the ﬁrm or its
meeting rate is increasing.
3.1.2 The separation decision
The optimal separation rule S (¯ a) = 0 together with equation (12) implies that the exit age
¯ a satisﬁes
e
−γ¯ a =( r − γ)U, (13)
for a given value of unemployment U. The idea is simple: ﬁrms with old enough capital
shut down because workers are too expensive, since the average productivity of vacancies
and, therefore, the workers’ outside option of searching, is growing at the rate of the leading
edge technology. Note that this equation resembles the proﬁt-maximization condition in the
frictionless economy, with the worker’s ﬂow outside option, (r −γ)U,p l a y i n gt h er o l eo ft h e
competitive wage rate.12
12In fact, later we show that the lowest wage paid in the economy (on machines of age a)e x a c t l ye q u a l s
the ﬂow value of unemployment.
13We can now rewrite the surplus function (12) in terms of the two endogenous variables










In this equation, and occasionally below, we use a notation of values (the surplus in this
case) that shows an explicit dependence of ¯ a and λf. From (14) it is immediately clear that
S(a;¯ a,λf) is strictly increasing in ¯ a and decreasing in λf. A longer life-span of capital ¯ a
increases the surplus at each age for two reasons. First, it increases the surplus ﬂow because
it lowers the ﬂow value of the worker’s outside option, (r − γ)U = e−γ¯ a. Second, it increases
the duration for which a match receives a positive surplus ﬂow. A higher rate at which ﬁrms
meet workers, λf, reduces the surplus because it increases the outside option for a ﬁrm: a
vacant ﬁrm meets workers at a higher rate.
The optimal separation (or job destruction) condition (13) requires that the lowest output
in operation be equal to the ﬂow value of unemployment. Using (7) and (10) we obtain
e
−γ¯ a = b + β
Z ¯ a
0
λw(a;¯ a,λf)S(a;¯ a,λf)da, (JD)
w h i c hi sa ne q u a t i o ni nt h et w ou n k n o w n s( ¯ a,λf)a n dt h er a t e sλw (a)a tw h i c hu n e m p l o y e d
workers are matched with ﬁrms. In Section (3.1.4) below, we explain how the two endogenous
variables determine the workers’ meeting rates.
3.1.3 The free-entry condition
We deﬁne the value of a vacancy of age a using the new expression (14) for the surplus of
am a t c hS(a;¯ a,λf)t o g e t h e rw i t h( 1 0 ) .T h ed i ﬀerential equation for a vacant ﬁrm (5) then





−(r−γ)(˜ a−a)S (˜ a;¯ a,λf)d˜ a, (15)
where ˆ a equals the age at which the vacant ﬁrm exits. Since vacant ﬁrms do not incur in
any direct search cost, they will exit the market at an age such that this expression equals 0,
from which it follows immediately that ˆ a =¯ a. Since in equilibrium there are no proﬁts from
entry, we must have that V (0;¯ a,λf)=I, and we thus have the free-entry (or job creation)
condition, which becomes





14This condition requires that the cost of creating a new job I equals the value of a vacant ﬁrm
at age zero, which is the expected present value of the proﬁts it will generate –a share (1 − β)
of the discounted future surpluses produced by a match occurring at the instantaneous rate
λf. The job creation condition is the second equation in the two unknowns (¯ a,λf).
3.1.4 The stationary distributions and measures
We now complete the characterization of the equilibrium and derive explicit expressions for
the matching probabilities in terms of the endogenous variables (¯ a,λf). The probabilities
λw(a) depend on the steady-state distributions of vacant ﬁrms. The inﬂow of new ﬁrms is
ν(0): new ﬁrms acquire the new capital and proceed to the vacancy pool. Thereafter, these
ﬁrms transit stochastically back and forth between vacancy and match, and they exit at
a =¯ a, whether vacant or matched (after matched, a ﬁrm can always become vacant at age
a<¯ a at rate δ). This means that ν(a)+µ(a)=ν(0) for all a ∈ [0,¯ a). The functions ν(a)
and µ(a)j u m pd o w nt o0d i s c o n t i n u o u s l ya t¯ a.F o ra ∈ [0,¯ a), the evolution of µ(a) therefore
follows
˙ µ(a)=−δµ(a)+λfν(a)=λfν(0) − (δ + λf)µ(a). (16)
Exogenous separations δµ(a) reduce employment, and vacancies being ﬁlled λfν(a)i n c r e a s e s





¯ a + 1
δ+λf(1 − e−(δ+λf)¯ a)







δ+λf(1 − e−(δ+λf)¯ a)
, (18)
where µ is the total mass of employed workers. The employment (vacancy) density is there-
fore increasing and concave (decreasing and convex) in age a. The reason for this is that
for every age a ∈ [0,¯ a) there is a constant number of machines, and older machines have a
larger cumulative probability of having been matched in the past. This feature distinguishes
our model from standard-search vintage models where the distribution of vacant jobs is de-
generate at zero and the employment density is decreasing in age a at a rate equal to the
exogenous destruction rate δ.
With the vacancy distribution in hand, we now have the explicit expression for the value






δ+λf(1 − e−(δ+λf)¯ a)
, (19)
which depends only on the pair of endogenous variables (¯ a,λf), given the relation between
θ and λf.
3.2 Analysis of the equilibrium
We now proceed to show that there exists a unique steady state for the economy with
frictions. We characterize the equilibrium in terms of the rate at which ﬁrms ﬁnd workers,
λf,a n dt h ee x i ta g e ,¯ a. These two variables are jointly determined by the job creation
condition (JC) and the job destruction condition (JD). We begin by studying each of the
two steady-state equations in turn. Next, we turn to the comparative statics of changes
in the unemployment beneﬁts b, the growth rate γ, the interest rate r,a n dt h ee ﬃciency
of the matching process (a parameter of the matching function). The formal proofs of our
arguments are contained in the Appendix.
3.2.1 The job creation condition (JC)
The job creation condition states that a potential entrant makes zero proﬁts from setting up
a new machine. We have
Lemma 1. The job creation condition (JC) describes a curve that is negatively sloped in
(¯ a,λf) space.
Lemma 1 follows from the fact that the vacancy value of new ﬁr m si si n c r e a s i n gi nt h ee x i t
age ¯ a a n di nt h er a t ea tw h i c hﬁrms ﬁnd workers λf.K e e p i n gλf constant, a longer life-span
of capital ¯ a increases the vacancy value of a new machine for two reasons: ﬁrst, it raises the
surplus in every match as explained above, and second, it prolongs the period over which the
new ﬁrm can recoup the initial investment. Keeping ¯ a constant, a higher rate at which ﬁrms
ﬁnd workers λf also increases the vacancy value of a new machine. The reason is simply
that, almost by deﬁnition, a match becomes more likely with a higher λf.E v e n t h o u g h
the surplus of a match declines in λf as discussed above, it is straightforward to prove that
this indirect eﬀect is always dominated by the direct eﬀect. The job creation condition thus
deﬁnes a curve in (¯ a,λf) space that has a negative slope: if the life-length of a machine goes
16up, the probability of ﬁnding a worker has to go down so that the value of entry remains at
I. This condition is plotted in Figure 1.
Lemma 2. As λf →∞ , the (JC) curve asymptotes to the exit age of the frictionless
economy, ¯ aCE.
Suppose ﬁrms live for a very short period: ¯ a is very close to zero. Even if vacant ﬁrms meet
workers for sure (with an arbitrarily high rate λf), the life-length of capital is too short for
the initial investment I to pay oﬀ. That is, a minimum life-length is necessary to ensure that
the free-entry condition can be satisﬁed with equality. The asymptote can be worked out to
lie exactly at the destruction age for the competitive solution ¯ aCE.I n t u i t i v e l y ,a sλf →∞ ,
the matching frictions disappear for vacancies and the ﬁrms’ entry problem becomes the
competitive problem (2) with solution ¯ aCE.





(1 − β)(1− rI)
. (20)
Suppose that λf is very close to zero. Even if the life-length of capital is inﬁnite, vacant
ﬁrms meet workers with a probability that is too low for the initial investment to pay oﬀ in
expected terms. The asymptote value λ
min
f is increasing in I a n di nt h ee ﬀective discount
rate r + δ, as they both make it more diﬃcult to recover the initial investment, and it is
decreasing in 1−β, the surplus share accruing to the ﬁrm. Notice that if rI > 1 (recall that
the condition for existence of the frictionless equilibrium is rI < 1), this asymptote would
be negative.
3.2.2 The job destruction condition (JD)
The job destruction condition states that the productivity of the marginal match at the
cutoﬀ age ¯ a equals the ﬂow value of the outside option for the worker.
Lemma 4. If the matching function is Cobb-Douglas, m(v,u) ≡ Avαu1−α, with α>1/2,
then the job destruction condition (JD) describes a curve that is positively sloped in (¯ a,λf)
space.
The characterization of the job destruction condition (JD) turns out to be a bit more in-
volved. After we multiply the (JD) equation with eγ¯ a, we can show that the right-hand side









Figure 1: Job Creation and Job Destruction conditions, plotted in the (λf,¯ a)-space.
of being unemployed depends on the expected surplus from a match, and we know that
the surplus function decreases in λf, as explained earlier. Also, a higher λf decreases the
unconditional meeting probability for workers λw by deﬁnition. But there is also a counter-
acting eﬀect that is unique to our model with a vacancy distribution: a faster meeting rate
for vacant ﬁrms shifts the vacancy density towards younger vintages with larger potential
surplus. We show that given the assumed Cobb-Douglas matching technology, the value
of search is decreasing in λf because the decline of the unconditional probability becomes
steep enough to overcome the counteracting shift in the vacancy distribution. Intuitively,
one can write λw ' (1/λf)
α
1−α so the larger is α, the steeper the decline in λw for a given
rise in λf.F o rt h ec u t - o ﬀ age ¯ a, a similar argument applies. First, the surplus is increasing
with ¯ a. However, the probability of meeting any given vintage–which the surplus function
is weighted by–decreases as ¯ a goes up; in particular, it becomes relatively more probable
to meet older vintages, and older vintages have lower surplus than younger ones. The latter
eﬀect is unambiguously dominated by the former eﬀect with the assumed aggregate matching
function. We conclude that the (JD) curve has a positive slope in (¯ a,λf) space (see Figure
1).
18Lemma 5. As λf →∞ , the (JD) curve asymptotes to ¯ amax = −ln(b)/γ > 0.
This result tells us that when the meeting frict i o n sd i s a p p e a r ,t h es u r p l u sg o e st oz e r oa n d
output on the marginal job equals the wage, which, in turn, would equal the marginal value
of leisure, given by the welfare beneﬁt b. For the labor market to be viable, we need to
impose the restriction b<1, where “1” represents the normalized output on the best ﬁrm;
otherwise no worker would accept any job.
3.2.3 Existence and uniqueness
Based on our characterization of the (JC) and (JD) curves we can now state a set of conditions
that imply the existence and uniqueness of the steady-state equilibrium.
Proposition 1 An equilibrium with ﬁnite values of the pair (¯ a,λf) exists if and only if
rI < 1 and ¯ amax > ¯ aCE. If the matching function is Cobb-Douglas with α>1/2,t h e nt h e
equilibrium is unique.
Proof. We ﬁrst prove the necessity of each condition. If rI > 1, then no job is created and
the job creation condition is not well deﬁned. As rI → 1,λ
min
f →∞and the (JC) and (JD)
curves do not intersect for a ﬁnite value of λf.I f¯ amax ≤ ¯ aCE, then the (JC) curve lies strictly
above the (JD) curve, and there is no intersection. Hence, if any of the two conditions of
the Lemma is violated, no equilibrium will exist. To prove suﬃciency, it is enough to
consider that if rI < 1, then λ
min
f and ¯ aCE are positive and ﬁnite, and if ¯ amax > ¯ aCE,t h e n






exists. Furthermore, if the matching function is Cobb-Douglas with α>1/2, then the (JD)
curve is monotonically increasing, and since the (JC) curve is monotonically decreasing, the
intersection of the two curves (and the equilibrium) is unique.
4 Comparative statics: qualitative results
We now study how technological change and labor market institutions interact in the de-
termination of the equilibrium income distribution and unemployment. In particular, we
are interested in the role of the rate of embodied technological change γ,a n dt h ep a y m e n t s
to workers when unemployed b. The parameter b represents the generosity of the welfare
system and simultaneously captures the degree of downward wage rigidity, given the fact
19that wages in Nash bargaining have the workers’ outside option as a lower bound. We also
study the eﬀects of changes in the interest rate r a n di nt h ee ﬃciency of matching A.F i r s t ,






, using the job creation and the job destruction curves. We then study the implied
changes for unemployment, wage inequality, and the labor share.
4.1 Comparative statics in (¯ a,λf)s p a c e
Lemma 6. Ar i s ei nb does not shift the (JC) curve but shifts the (JD) curve downward,
inducing a fall in ¯ a∗ and a rise in λ
∗
f.
The comparative statics of a rise in b a r es i m p l e :t h e( J C )c u r v ei su n a ﬀected by the worker’s
payoﬀ determinants, and therefore by the unemployment beneﬁt. A higher beneﬁtw i l l
increase workers’ outside options, so in order to restore the (JD) condition, output on the
marginal job has to increase. Hence, for a given value of λf,t h ee x i ta g e¯ a must fall, which
induces a downward shift of the job-destruction curve. Workers become more expensive for
ﬁrms without becoming more productive, and therefore machines are scrapped earlier. The
upper panel of Figure 2 shows that the equilibrium moves along the (JC) curve and that both
the life length of ﬁrms and labor market tightness thus fall unambiguously. In particular,
the general equilibrium feedback weakens the fall in the life-length of capital, but transfers
part of the impact of the shock on a reduction in ﬁrms’ entry.14
Lemma 7. Ar i s ei nγ shifts the (JC) curve and the (JD) curve downward, inducing a fall
in ¯ a∗. The change in λ
∗
f is ambiguous.
The comparative statics for γ are somewhat more complicated because an increase in γ
has two counteracting eﬀects on the surplus function (14). First, a higher γ means that a
vintage’s output relative to the frontier falls at a faster rate with age. This obsolescence
eﬀect decreases the surplus of a match. On the other hand, a higher γ reduces the relative
output of the marginal technology of age ¯ a and thereby shrinks the outside option value of
a worker. This worker’s outside option eﬀect increases the surplus of a match. The older a
match is the stronger will be the obsolescence eﬀect and the shorter the time period for which
14Upon impact, the higher b leads to a higher wage, lower proﬁts, and shorter job duration; the reduction
in ﬁrms’ proﬁts, in turn, decreases their incentive to enter the labor market with new machines (λf increases).
The implied fall in the meeting rate for workers tends to reduce their outside option and hence their hiring
costs and increase proﬁts, therefore making a smaller fall in ¯ a necessary for the adjustment to the new
equilibrium.
20it will beneﬁt from the worker’s outside option eﬀect. We show that there is a critical age
such that for vintages younger (older) than this critical age the surplus rises (falls) with γ.I n
particular, at age zero there is no obsolescence eﬀect, so the surplus of a new machine grows
unambiguously with γ; this last remark will be important later, once we compare our model
with the standard Aghion-Howitt/Mortensen-Pissarides framework where all vacancies are
of age zero.
Notwithstanding this non-monotonicity of the surplus function, we can prove that the
shifts of the (JC) and (JD) curves are unambiguous. A rise in γ increases the value of
new vacancies and thus shifts the (JC) curve downward: for a given scrapping age, a lower
meeting rate for vacant ﬁrms is necessary to bring the value of vacancies back in line with
the constant set-up cost I. If we turn to the (JD) curve, a rise in γ reduces output on the
marginal job, but also increases the value of search for an unemployed worker, as waiting is
compensated by the expectation of being matched to a more productive ﬁrm. Both eﬀects
lead to the conclusion that for the (JD) condition to hold for a given market tightness,
the marginal machine has to be scrapped earlier so the curve will shift downward. Taking
these two shifts together, we see that the life length of ﬁrms declines unambiguously with
a higher rate of technological change. Whether labor market tightness goes up or down
depends on the relative slopes of the two curves and the initial position of the curves, that
is, on the “starting values” for the parameters, including the initial growth rate (see the
lower and central panels of Figure 2). This is an important factor for understanding the
complementarity of growth and institutions, as explained below.
Lemma 8. Ar i s ei nr shifts the (JC) and (JD) curves upward, inducing an increase in ¯ a∗.
The eﬀect on λ
∗
f is ambiguous.
An increase in the interest rate lowers the weight on future proﬁts and thus lowers surplus.
This surplus reduction makes the job destruction curve shift up: for a given λf,t h ew o r k e r
who is indiﬀerent between staying on the job and leaving now needs a longer life on the
job to counteract the fall in the surplus of the job. Similarly, the job creation curve shifts
up: a lower surplus must be counteracted by a longer life in order for the ﬁrm to remain
indiﬀerent between entering and not entering. As a result, higher interest rates induce a rise















Curve shifts after a rise in γ:







JC Curve shifts after a rise in γ:
Response along the duration margin
Figure 2: Qualitative comparative statics with respect to b (top graph) and γ (middle and
bottom graph). The label E refers to the initial (pre-shock) equilibrium and the label E0 to
the ﬁnal equilibrium. The dotted lines represent the JC and the JD curves after changes in
b and γ.
22The severity of the matching friction can be regulated with the level of the shift parameter
of the matching function (A in the Cobb-Douglas formulation).
Lemma 9. In the limit, as A →∞ , the frictions disappear, and the equilibrium with
frictions converges to the competitive equilibrium.
As A →∞ , the matching friction vanishes and the equilibrium of the economy entails
a → aCE and λf →∞ . Recall that, when λf →∞in the standard matching model without
vacancy heterogeneity, a → 0: the vintage structure vanishes without frictions. In our
model, the vintage capital structure survives in limiting frictionless equilibrium. Frictions
extend the life of capital, but are not necessary for old machines to be operated by workers
in equilibrium.
4.2 Unemployment, inequality, and labor share as functions of
(¯ a,λf)






for a given parameter






together with the underlying parameter
change determines the labor market outcomes in which we are interested, namely unemploy-
ment, wage inequality, and the wage-income share.
In steady state, the ﬂow into unemployment equals the ﬂow out of unemployment. That
is,
δµ+ µ(¯ a)=λwu = m(θ,1)u. (21)
To understand how unemployment responds to changes in the pair (¯ a,λf), it is convenient




δ + µ(¯ a)/µ
m(θ,1)
,( 2 2 )
which is simply the product of unemployment incidence and duration. The degree of en-
dogenous job destruction µ(a)/µ, that is, the fraction of matched jobs destroyed at ¯ a,c a nb e
read in (17). A rise in ¯ a reduces the unemployment rate, since endogenous job destruction is
reduced. A rise in λf has two counteracting eﬀects. First, a higher λf reduces the meeting
probability for unemployed workers, which in turn increases unemployment duration. Sec-
ond, a higher λf reduces endogenous job destruction, w h i c hi nt u r nr e d u c e su n e m p l o y m e n t
incidence. As λf increases, vacant ﬁrms meet workers at a faster rate, so the employment
distribution shifts towards younger machines, and there are relatively fewer machines at the
23exit age. We can show that for the Cobb-Douglas matching function with α>1/2, the ﬁrst
eﬀect dominates and unemployment increases with λf.15
Wage payments support the surplus-sharing allocation in the economy with frictions.
Embodied technical change therefore generates wage inequality since it implies productiv-
ity diﬀerences across vintages. Using the surplus-based deﬁnition (10) of the value of an
employed worker W(a) in equation (8) and rearranging terms, we obtain the wage rate as
w(a)=( r − γ)U + β [(r − γ + δ)S (a) − S
0 (a)].
Using the diﬀerential equation for the surplus (11), we obtain the wage equation
w(a)=( r − γ)U + β
£
e
−γa − (r − γ)U − λf (1 − β)S (a)
¤
. (23)
T h eN a s hw a g er a t ee x c e e d st h eﬂow value of unemployment by a fraction β of the quasi-
rents. This latter term is composed by the production ﬂow e−γa, net of the worker’s ﬂow
outside option (r−γ)U and net of the ﬁrm’s expected surplus share of being in an alternative
match λf (1 − β)S (a). The last term is age-speciﬁc and it is intrinsically related to the
value to older ﬁrms of becoming vacant. In standard models, this value is zero for every
ﬁrm. The wage equation also conﬁrms that at the separation age ¯ a,t h eﬁrm and the worker
are indiﬀerent between continuing the match and separating. Evaluating (23) at ¯ a together
with the destruction condition shows that w(¯ a)=e−γ¯ a,t h a ti s ,t h eﬂow proﬁts are zero. It
also demonstrates that w(¯ a)=( r − γ)U,t h a ti s ,t h ew o r k e ri si n d i ﬀerent between working
and entering unemployment.
Wage inequality in the economy is determined by two factors: the maximum wage dif-





1 − λf(1 − β)S(0;¯ a,λf)
e−γ¯ a . (24)
A longer life-span for the job increases the distance between the highest and lowest produc-
tivity in the economy, thus raising wage inequality: the technological heterogeneity eﬀect.
We explain in the proof of Lemma 9 that as the meeting rate for ﬁrms λf →∞ ,t h eﬂow
outside option for the new ﬁrm grows towards the highest possible ﬂow proﬁt1−e−γ¯ a,t h u s
the term multiplied by β in (24) converges to one, implying (as in the competitive economy)
15To show this result, multiply both numerator and denominator of (22) by λf and diﬀerentiate u/(1−u)
with respect to λf.
24perfect wage equality: the ﬁrm’s outside option eﬀect. The intuition is that as λf increases,
ﬁrms meet at a faster rate and their bargaining position improves so much that gradually
workers are squeezed against their outside option, which is constant, so wage inequality falls.
The changes in the employment distribution are also crucial for equilibrium inequality
because, given that the wage rate (23) has a constant component and a component linked to
the productivity of the vintage, younger vintages display larger inequality. As shown before,
an increase in λf or a reduction in ¯ a shifts the employment distribution towards younger
vintages, with more inequality: the distributional eﬀects.
Finally, consider the labor share.16 A shorter life-length of capital ¯ a unambiguously
increases the wage share through a rise in the equilibrium outside option of the worker e−γ¯ a.
Instead, a larger ﬁrm’s meeting rate λf improves the ﬁrm’s threat point in the bargaining
and reduces the wage share of output in each match. The distributional eﬀects following
an increase in λf or a reduction in ¯ a shift the employment distribution towards younger
vintages, which have smaller labor share of output (recall that on matches of age ¯ a the labor
share is one).
4.3 How inequalities are aﬀected by growth and institutions
What are the qualitative eﬀects on labor market variables of changes in the welfare system
and the rate of technological change? For our model we ﬁnd that a more generous welfare
system increases unemployment, tends to redu c ew a g ei n e q u a l i t y ,a n di sl i k e l yt oh a v en o
impact on the labor share. We also ﬁnd that a faster rate of technological change tends to
increase unemployment and wage inequality and tends to reduce the labor share.
A more generous welfare system, higher b, decreases ¯ a∗ and increases λ
∗
f,w h i c hl e a d st oa
rise in the unemployment rate: both incidence and duration increase (see the upper panel of
Figure 2). Economies with higher b should display less wage inequality. Because technological
heterogeneity declines (¯ a falls) and the ﬁrm’s outside option increases (λf increases), the
maximum wage diﬀerential across vintages falls, which tends to reduce inequality across
vintages. There is a countervailing eﬀect since the new equilibrium employment distribution
gives more weight to younger vintages, which display more wage inequality. Barring strong
changes in the employment distribution, however, inequality will fall with b.W e l f a r eb e n e ﬁts
16A closed-form expression for the labor share in our model can be obtained, but it does not add much to
the intuition we have built in the previous analysis on the wage rate and on inequality, so we omit it.
25have conﬂicting eﬀects on the labor share, as explained above, so we should not expect large
diﬀerences across economies with diﬀerent b.
A faster rate of embodied technological change, higher γ,l o w e r s¯ a∗ and has an ambiguous
eﬀect on λ
∗
f. The shorter lifetime of ﬁrms increases the unemployment rate through a higher
unemployment incidence. The ambiguity with respect to the worker-ﬁnding rate can be
understood by looking at the two extremes depicted in Figure 2. We could be in an economy
that responds to the shock with a sharp fall in ¯ a but no signiﬁcant change in λf,g e n e r a t i n g
a higher unemployment incidence, but little change in unemployment duration (the central
panel of Figure 2). Alternatively, we could be in an economy where job separation rates (¯ a)
are barely aﬀected and all the adjustment takes place through a lower entry rate of ﬁrms
(λf), that is, unemployment duration rises with little impact on unemployment incidence
(the lower panel of Figure 2).
A faster rate of embodied technological change directly increases wage inequality. This
is counteracted by the implied decline of the exit age ¯ a. Furthermore, if the ﬁrm’s contact
rate λf rises strongly, it will create an additional tendency towards lower inequality through
the ﬁrm’s outside option eﬀect. Overall, we expect the direct eﬀect to dominate, but wage
inequality will tend to increase more in economies that respond through the unemployment
incidence margin (λf) rather than the unemployment duration margin (¯ a).
A faster rate of embodied technological change tends to reduce the labor income share.
The direct eﬀect of a rise in γ reduces the equilibrium value of unemployment, e−γ¯ a,a n dt h e
share of output going to labor in each job. The indirect eﬀect through ¯ a and λf depends
crucially on the margin of adjustment. In economies that adjust through the unemployment
incidence margin, the substantial shortening of job durations tends to counteract the direct
eﬀect and increases the labor share. In economies that adjust through the unemployment
duration margin, the substantial increase of the ﬁrm’s contact rate improves the ﬁrm’s outside
option value and reduces the worker’s share in production. Finally, as explained, changes in
the employment distribution always reinforcet h ef a l li nt h el a b o rs h a r e . T h u s ,w es h o u l d
expect a more dramatic fall in the labor share in economies responding through the duration
margin.
Finally, consider the interaction of labor market institutions and technological change.
We argue that in our model labor market institutions can, at least qualitatively, account
for a diﬀerential response in labor market variables to the same acceleration in embodied
26technological change. Consider ﬁrst a low-beneﬁts economy (the United States). An accel-
eration in the rate of productivity growth of new vintages represents an obsolescence shock
that makes installed capital obsolete faster —labor costs grow at a swifter pace over the life
of a job with ﬁxed productivity. Firms respond to the obsolescence shock by adopting new
technologies more rapidly, and in order to do that ﬁrms must shorten the optimal life-length
of machines. The U.S. economy reduces the lifetime of machines and adjusts along the
unemployment incidence margin discussed above (see the central panel in Figure 2). Now
consider the response of a high-beneﬁts economy (Europe). In our previous discussion we
argued that higher beneﬁts move the initial equilibrium down the job creation curve towards
its ﬂat region (see the bottom panel in Figure 2). W i t ha ni n i t i a lp o s i t i o nw h e r et h ej o b
creation curve is very ﬂat, a rise in the growth rate γ will induce a much larger rise in λf.
The logic for this result is straightforward. High beneﬁts and high labor costs have already
pushed the optimal life-length of capital very close to its technological minimum ¯ aCE,a n d
the life-time of a machine cannot be reduced much further. Since operating ﬁrms cannot
decrease ¯ a any more, they need to be compensated in a diﬀerent way, i.e. through an increase
in their contact rate when positions are vacant. The corresponding stronger decrease in the
worker’s meeting rates induces a larger rise in unemployment duration, a smaller increase in
wage inequality, and a larger decline in the labor share of aggregate income. To conclude,
the level of the policy determines the location of the pre-shock equilibrium and this, in turn,
determines the nature of the adjustment.
5 The quantitative role of technology-policy comple-
mentarity
We now go beyond a purely qualitative analysis. We will organize the analysis around the
United States—Europe comparison; a by-product of this calibration analysis will be the an-
swer to our ﬁrst quantitative question: what is the role of the mechanism we study for
residual wage inequality and unemployment? The United States—Europe question is: can
our simple model account quantitatively for the diﬀerential behavior of unemployment, wage
inequality, and income shares in the United States and Europe over the past thirty years?
In our experiment we calculate the steady-state responses of the model economies to the ob-
served increase of the rate of embodied technological change γ. The model economies diﬀer
27with respect to the policy measure b, which we interpret as a form of welfare beneﬁta n d / o r
downward wage rigidity. We ﬁnd that the same increase of the rate of technological change
implies a larger increase of the unemploymentr a t ea n das m a l l e ri n c r e a s eo fw a g ei n e q u a l -
ity in economies with high welfare beneﬁts. Quantitatively, the diﬀerential unemployment
response of high and low welfare payment economies calibrated to continental Europe and
the United States is remarkably similar in magnitude to the actual diﬀerential response of
these economies.
The benchmark model does not match the diﬀerential response of the labor income share:
although it predicts that the labor income share will decline, the magnitude of the decline is
the same for all economies. We consider the potential of another diﬀerence in labor market
institutions–employment protection–to account for the diﬀerential response in the shares
of labor income. Employment protection legislation tends to be much stricter in continental
Europe than in the United States. In Section 5.3, we study the eﬀect of a simple version
of employment protection and we ﬁnd that stricter employment protection in continental
Europe can account for the relatively larger decline of the labor income share in Europe.
5.1 Calibration
The quantitative analysis requires calibration of the model economy. In the calibration,
we choose to match U.S. averages for the pre-1970 period since the technological shock we
model is likely to have hit the economy around the early-mid 1970s.17 Moreover, initially we
choose to represent Europe as an economy that diﬀers from the United States only in terms
of policy. This choice simpliﬁes the interpretation of the results since the diﬀerent outcomes
are entirely attributable to diﬀerent policies. Later, we relax this assumption. Finally, it
is important to point out that in the experiment we treat the data for the late 1960s and
mid-1990s as both representing steady states.
Given the choice of a Cobb-Douglas matching function with constant elasticity of match-
ing with respect to unemployment equal to α and scale parameter A (that we normalize
to 1), the model has seven parameters: {r,δ,α,β,I,b,γL}. We set r to match an annual
interest rate of 7%.18 We set δ in order to match an annual worker’s separation rate from
17See Hornstein and Krusell (1998) and Acemoglu (2000) for discussions of the timing of the technological
acceleration.
18This value of r is slightly larger than the one commonly used in the literature, but it is necessary to
keep r>γin every experiment so that the inﬁnite discounted sums are all well deﬁned. In Section 5.4 we
28employment to unemployment equal to 25%, as reported in CEPR (1995, page 10).19 We
choose α to match an average unemployment duration of approximately 8-9 weeks (as re-
ported by Abrahams and Shimer [2001]), which together with the above separation rates
gives us an unemployment rate of 4%, the U.S. value for the early 1970s (as reported in
Table 1). The Nash bargaining parameter β is chosen to match a labor share of 0.69, and
the cost of setting up a production unit I is chosen to reproduce an average age of capital of
about 11.4 years, as reported by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (1994) for the late 1960s.
The speed of embodied technological change γ is matched to the inverse of the rate of
decline of quality-adjusted relative price of equipment before and after the mid-1970s. This
procedure implies a value of 3.5 %p e ry e a rf o rt h eﬁrst steady state with a low rate of embod-
ied technical change (γL). As documented in Gordon’s (1990) inﬂuential work on quality-
adjusted prices for durable goods, and more recently by Cummins and Violante (2002), in
the last two decades the speed of embodied technical change has increased substantially to
reach 6.5% in the years 1995-2000.20 How reasonable is it to assume that the shock is com-
mon between the U.S. and Europe? A recent OECD study (Colecchia and Schreyer 2001)
measures the decline in relative price for several high-tech equipment items across various
countries in Europe from 1980 to 2000. Table 2 shows that in the last decade large European
countries experienced an acceleration quantitatively comparable to the United States. Since
high-tech goods drove the technological acceleration in the aggregate price index, we can be
conﬁdent that the aggregate indexes should display similar patterns.21
discuss the impact of changes in r.
19In the model, the separation rate, i.e., the unconditional probability that a worker separates from a job
within the period, is deﬁned as [δ + µ(¯ a)]/µ. Note that it would be incorrect to match this variable to
job destruction rates (i.e., job ﬂows rather than worker ﬂows, as we do) since the event occurring at rate δ
involves only a separation of workers and machines, but not the destruction of the job.
20Other authors, using measurement techniques diﬀerent from quality-adjusted relative prices, arrived at
very similar conclusions on the pace of embodied technical change in the postwar era (see for example Hobjin
2000) for the United States.
21Ideally, one would like to compare growth rates in the 1970s as well, but these are not available for
European countries. Table 1 shows that in some continental European countries the measured acceleration
is even larger than in the United States, but one should keep in mind that the high-tech goods’ share of
aggregate equipment in these same countries is likely to be smaller than in the United States.
29Table 2: Acceleration of capital-embodied technical change
U.S. UK France Germany Italy
Computers 7.6 7.3 7.4 4.8 8.7
Communications 4.4 5.1 5.5 2.6 7.4
Software 1.9 2.8 3.0 2.2 5.1
Note: Diﬀe r e n c eb e t w e e nt h er a t eo fd e c l i n eo fq u a l i t y - a d j u s t e d
relative price of equipment-capital type in the period 1990-2000
and the period 1980-1990.
Source: Table 4, Colecchia and Schreyer (OECD 2001)
In our experiment we gradually increase the annual growth rate γ from 3.5% to 6.5% and
study the response of unemployment, wage inequality, and the labor share for economies with
diﬀerent values of the beneﬁts parameter b. This simple parameter is supposed to summarize
a wide variation of beneﬁt policies with respect to unemployment duration, family situation
(none of which we model), and country. The OECD Employment Outlook (1996) computes
average replacement rates from unemployment beneﬁts in OECD countries from 1961 to
1995 for two earnings levels, three family types, and three durations of unemployment. In
the mid-1970s the OECD average replacement rates for the United States were 11%, whereas
for many European countries the replacement rates were 40% or higher in the same time
period (Chart 2.2, page 29).22
The OECD replacement rates for Europe understate the measure of beneﬁts that we
use in our model, for many European countries oﬀer long-term social assistance schemes in
addition to unemployment beneﬁts. Our parameter should reﬂect these policies since most
of them are not earnings-related and have indeﬁnite duration. Hansen (1998) computes
corrected replacement ratios to account for social assistance and ﬁnds much larger values for
a set of European countries, all between 45% and 72% (Hansen 1998, Graph 3, page 29).23
In the baseline economy, which we interpret as the U.S. economy before the technological
acceleration, we set b =0 .05, which implies a ratio of welfare beneﬁts to average wage of
roughly 10%. To model European-type economies, we gradually increase b to 0.4, which
implies a ratio of welfare beneﬁts to average wage of roughly 70%. Finally, although in
the data there is some time-series variation in these replacement rates, we model them as
constant through time, that is, the only source of shock is the rate of productivity growth
of capital. Bertola, Blau, and Kahn (2001) and Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) ﬁnd that
22The same OECD data source documents that average replacement rates reached peaks of 50% in the
Netherlands, 45% in Belgium, 37% in France, 35% in Spain, and 30% in Germany.
23These replacement rates are calculated for a 40-year old single male production worker.
30time-variation in labor market institutions is small compared to cross-country diﬀerences
and empirically accounts for a minor fraction of unemployment rate diﬀerentials.
The calibrated parameter values are summarized in the following table:
Table 3: Calibration of the Model Economy
Parameter Value Moment to match
r 0.017 interest rate
δ 0.0515 separation rate (CEPR 1995)
β 0.50 labor share (Cooley 1995)
α 0.55 unemployment duration (Abrahams and Shimer 2001)
I 14.5 average life of capital (BEA 2001)
b 0.05-0.4 welfare beneﬁts (OECD 1996 )
γL 0.009-0.016 relative price of equipment (Krusell et al. 2000)
Note: A unit time period represents one quarter.
Finally, we should stress that we have not used any of the parameters to try to match the
initial level of wage inequality in the data. Ther e a s o ni st h a tw a g ei n e q u a l i t yi nt h i sm o d e l
is purely due to vintage capital eﬀects and we are not aware of data counterparts measuring
the extent of inequality that can be attributed to this source. One contribution of our work
is that we can use the calibrated model as a measurement tool to ﬁnd out how much wage
inequality is generated by this mechanism in a United States-like economy. We return to
this point in the next section.
5.2 Results
The main quantitative results of our experiment are reported in Figure 3, where a number of
equilibrium outcomes of the model (unemployment rate, unemployment duration, separation
rate, maximum age of capital, wage inequality, and labor share) are plotted for diﬀerent
rates of embodied technical change (from 3.5% to 6.5 % )a n df o rd i ﬀerent levels of the policy
variable of interest b (from 0.05 to 0.40).
The contribution of vintage capital and matching frictions to wage inequality.
Let us start with wage inequality, measured by the 90-10 log-wage diﬀerential. As ex-
plained, the model is designed to generate inequality among ex ante equal workers, which
originates from a combination of labor market frictions and vintage capital diﬀerentials.
Figure 3 shows that in the ﬁnal steady state of the baseline economy the 90-10 log-wage
31diﬀerential is around 7%. An alternative way to measure inequality induced by this mecha-
nism is to say that a vintage diﬀerential of 10 years in the capital used by ﬁrms translates
into a wage gap of about 6% in our model economy. How reasonable is this number? We
are not aware of any exact data counterpart, but Doms, Dunne, and Troske (1998) provide
an interesting benchmark of comparison. They examine a sample of U.S. plants in 1988 for
which one can observe both the degree of technological advancement of the plant (i.e., the
technologies recently adopted) and the characteristics of the workers (like education) and
conclude that the wage diﬀerential induced only by the technological gap between a plant
in the top quartile and a plant in the bottom quartile of the technological scale is 8.4% for
production workers and 12.7% for technical and non-production workers (Table III, page
267). These ﬁgures seem to suggest that our estimates are of the right size.
How much do vintage capital and matching frictions contribute to overall wage inequality
among ex ante identical workers in the U.S. economy? According to Katz and Autor (1999)
the 90-10 log-wage diﬀerential of “residual” wage inequality, that is inequality not related to
observable characteristics, such as age and education, is about 90%. Gottschalk and Moﬃtt
(1994) argue that the fraction of residual inequality accounted for by permanent unobservable
characteristics of individuals, that is “innate ability”, is roughly 2/3. Thus, the model tells
us that in the United States labor market frictions, together with vintage capital, account
for almost 25% of wage inequality among ex-ante equal workers. The remaining inequality
can be the result of match quality and skill dynamics within and between jobs.
The impact of a faster rate of technological change on labor market inequalities.
The eﬀect of a faster rate of technological change on wage inequality is ambiguous and
depends on the magnitude of the policy variable b. Figure 3 shows that wage inequality in
the U.S.-type economy rises by 1 point. As explained earlier, this increase in inequality is
brought about essentially by an increase in technological heterogeneity through the interplay
between a higher γ (a large productivity diﬀerential across successive vintages of machines)
and a lower ¯ a (a lower age gap between the youngest and the oldest machine; see Figure
5). In the simulations, the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates, and the distributional eﬀects are always
fairly small. The ﬁrm’s outside option eﬀect restrains inequality from a sharp surge. In
economies with a large b, the increase in λf is massive, so this latter eﬀect is very strong and
in some extreme cases (e.g., b =0 .4), can dominate the larger technological heterogeneity
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Figure 3: The eﬀects of a rise in the rate of embodied technical change γ in the vintage-capital
model when the economies diﬀer only via the level of welfare beneﬁts b.
33and lead wage inequality to fall.24 The model suggests that wage inequality did not increase
in continental Europe as a response to the shock because the sharp increase in unemployment
duration improved the bargaining position of the ﬁrms so as to squeeze workers against their
outside option, which is invariant. It is worth remarking that this argument, based on the
ﬁrm’s outside option, is a unique feature of our model with vacancy heterogeneity.
A faster rate of technological change increases unemployment for all values of the welfare
beneﬁts, but the increase is much more pronounced for European-type economies with high
b. If we take the cautious view that the new steady-state level of capital-embodied produc-
tivity growth is 5.5%, then the model predicts that in the baseline economy unemployment
moves very little, by less than 1 point, whereas for b =0 .40 unemployment jumps by 6
percentage points. It is clear from Figure 3 that although both unemployment duration
and the separation rate rise with γ, the bulk of the diﬀerential increase in unemployment is
explained by the former: the separation rate changes only very marginally, by roughly 1%
in all the economies considered, while the increase in unemployment duration is small in the
U.S.-type economy (from 8.5 to 10.5 weeks) but is substantial in the economies with high
b,f r o m1 9t o3 8w e e k sw h e nb =0 .4. This result is consistent with the recent experience
of European labor markets, where labor turnover did not increase signiﬁcantly, and where
most of the increase in the unemployment rate is associated to longer durations (Machin
and Manning 1999). Overall, quantitatively, the diﬀerential rise in unemployment rate is of
an order of magnitude comparable to the data in Table 1.
The labor income share (last panel of Figure 3) declines as γ increases, independently of
the magnitude of the policy parameter b. Note also that the model generates labor shares of
a similar size independently of the magnitude of the policy parameter b, whereas in Europe
the labor share has been slightly above the US value until 1980. This independence reﬂects
the oﬀsetting eﬀects of b on the labor share discussed in Section 4.3. As expected, the labor
share falls with γ:ar i s ef r o m3 .5% to 5.5% reduces the labor share in every economy by
6%. The magnitude of this decline of the labor share is in line with the data for continental
European economies in Table 1 (6 points). On the other hand, the size of the US labor
income share decline in the data is substantially smaller than is predicted by the model.
In the next section, we argue that the inclusion of another important labor market policy,
24Note that this decline in wage inequality is not inconsistent with the European data. Table 1 shows that
wage inequality fell on average in Europe from 1980 to 1990, and in some countries such as Germany and
Norway kept falling until the mid 1990s.
34employment protection legislation, helps the model match the diﬀerential decline in labor
shares.
One limitation of our experiment is that the model economies initially (i.e., for a low
value of γ) display a large unemployment diﬀerential since they only diﬀer through the
policy b. The data in Table 1 show that the unemployment rates in continental Europe and
the United States were quite similar in the early 1970s. Machin and Manning (1999) report
that although they had a similar unemployment rate in that period, unemployment duration
was already much longer in continental Europe (Machin and Manning 1999, Table 4, page
3100). To account for this observation, we modify the experiment and change the separation
rate δ with the policy parameter b to keep the initial unemployment rate constant at 4%.
The results are in Figure 4: the rise in unemployment is still magniﬁed by the policy b by an
amount which is in line with the data, and the bulk of the rise is once again due to longer
durations, with the separation rates changing very little. The changes in wage inequality
and labor share remain of the same magnitude.
The model’s implications for labor market inequalities are closely related to its predictions
for the economic lifespan of capital. In the wake of a technological acceleration the age of
capital declines in the model: ﬁrms scrap their machines earlier in response to a faster
obsolescence rate.The Bureau of Economic Analysis publishes data on the age of capital for
the U.S. economy since 1925. In Figure 5 we plot the average age of private ﬁxed assets
(BEA 2002, Table 2.10) for our sample period 1965-1995. Average age in the United States
falls from 11.4 years in 1965 to 8.6 in 1985 and then it rises again to 9.5 years in 1995. The
model’s age of capital (Figures 3 and 4) falls to 8.7 as γ approaches 5.5%. Overall, the size
of the age decline in the model is quite similar to that in the United States, with the U.S.
data showing a fall by 17% and the model by 25%.
5.3 Extension: employment protection legislation
Our analysis of diﬀerences in labor market institutions has focused so far on the role of
welfare beneﬁts/unemployment insurance. This analysis has successfully accounted for the
diﬀerential response on unemployment and wage inequality in Europe and the United States
to an increase of the rate of technological change. Diﬀerences in welfare beneﬁts, however,
cannot account for the diﬀerential response of the labor income share in these countries. We
now assess whether diﬀerences in employment protection legislation, in particular a ﬁring
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Figure 4: The eﬀects of a rise in the rate of embodied technical change γ in the vintage-
capital model when the economies diﬀer both via the level of welfare beneﬁts b and the
exogenous separation rate δ.



















Figure 5: Average age of capital in the U.S. economy (in years), 1965-1995. Source: Bureau
of Economic Analysis (2002), Table 2.10.
tax, can account for the diﬀerential response of the labor income share.
Introducing a pure ﬁring tax complicates the analysis signiﬁcantly. The destruction age
for a vacancy, ˆ a, would no longer be the same as the destruction age for an existing match,
¯ a. This is because prior to matching, the cost of the dissolution of the match in the future–
the ﬁring tax–is not a liability, and it will not become one until the match is formed. An
existing match treats this cost as sunk and the match dissolves at a capital age such that the
total surplus of the match (which includes a liability T to the government) equals −T:a t
this point the marginal proﬁt ﬂow from production is equal to zero. A vacancy would not be
posted at such an age because the total surplus is negative, so vacant capital withdraws from
the market at an earlier age than matched capital: ˆ a<¯ a. Formally, the presence of a ﬁring
tax leads to two diﬀerent notions of surplus: surplus upon hiring, where the disagreement in
the bargaining does not imply the payment of the tax, and surplus during the match, where
it does. As a result, we have a two-tier labor market (with two wage functions) and two
destruction thresholds. The structure of the model with a simple ﬁring tax is therefore quite
diﬀerent from the one studied above.
37Fortunately, there is a simple way to introduce an employment protection policy without
aﬀecting the structure of our equilibrium. Consider an employment protection policy that
combines a ﬁring tax with a hiring subsidy. In particular, assume that in an existing match
the ﬁrm pays a ﬁring tax T on separation, and a vacant ﬁrm that hires a worker receives
a hiring subsidy T.25 In Appendix A.6 we solve the model and show that the modiﬁed
destruction rule for a match is
e
−γ¯ a +( r − γ)T =( r − γ)U. (25)
The intuition behind this equation is easy to grasp once it is understood that the policy T
has the form of a zero-coupon government bond from which the ﬁrm is entitled to receive the
growth-adjusted return, r − γ, for the duration of the match. In other words, every period
the ﬁrm’s payoﬀ from the match is augmented by the amount (r − γ)T, which will tend to
extend the life-length of capital.
In the Appendix we show that the new wage function is
w(a)=( r − γ)U + β
£
e
−γa + λf(1 − β)S(a) − (r − γ)(U − T)
¤
. (26)
As before, we have w(¯ a)=( r − γ)U, and a separation will occur when the marginal oper-
ating proﬁto ft h eﬁrm e−γ¯ a +( r − γ)T is entirely paid into the wage bill. The job creation
and job destruction equations become
e
−γ¯ a +( r − γ)T = b + β
Z ¯ a
0
λw(a;¯ a,λf)S(a;¯ a,λf)da, (JD’)





One can see that the comparative statics of the job creation curve (JC’) are unchanged. The
comparative statics of the job destruction curve (JD’) with respect to γ are also qualitatively
unchanged. Now, however, a rise in γ reduces the LHS of (JD’) by an amount that increases
with the size of T,s ot h ep o l i c ya m p l i ﬁes the downward shift of the (JD’) curve. Here the
policy-technology complementarity is very stark. Equation (26) makes clear that the larger
the tax/subsidy T, the more the wage will fall as γ increases: through bargaining, the worker
can appropriate a share β of this additional return to the match, and the fall in this quasi-rent
due to an increase in the growth rate γ is proportional to T. This mechanism will tend to
25This tax/subsidy scheme implies that every period the policy satisﬁes a balanced budget constraint for
the government because total separations equal newly created matches in steady-state.
38reduce the labor share more severely in economies with more generous employment protection
policies. Finally, as we should expect, a rise in the ﬁring tax (for a given γ)s h i f t st h e( J D ’ )
curve upward, inducing longer job tenures and more ﬁrm entry, which unambiguously lowers
unemployment.
We now move to the quantitative analysis. Based on the data on ﬁring costs reported
in the OECD Employment Outlook (1999), we choose a conservative range for the tax
T running from zero to one year of salary.26 T h er e s u l t sa r ed i s p l a y e di nF i g u r e6 . I n
economies with a high ﬁring tax T, the labor share starts at a higher level and falls much
faster as γ increases, following the same pattern as in the data: the ﬁring tax can account
for a 4.5 percentage point diﬀerential decline across economies, which is very close to the
number implied by Table 1, 4.3%. Although the model economy is able to generate this
diﬀerential fall, in absolute terms it overpredicts the decline in the labor share. For the
United States, it predicts a fall of 6%, whereas the decline in the labor share in the U.S. data
is only 1.5%. Interestingly, the ﬁring tax is much less important than the welfare beneﬁts
in the determination of cross-country diﬀerences in the evolution of the unemployment rate:
independently of the level of T, unemployment duration and separation rates change by very
similar amounts in the model.
In conclusion, employment protection does not seem to be responsible for diﬀerent pat-
terns of unemployment between U.S. and Europe, but it might be important in understanding
the diﬀerent evolutions of the distribution of income between capital and labor.
5.4 Discussion of related results in the literature
Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) are among the ﬁrst to study quantitatively the channel of
technology-policy complementarity to explain the relative labor market performances of the
U.S. and Europe. They model the common shock as a rise in the degree of skill depreciation
of unemployed workers and analyze the impact of this shock in a search model where workers
receive unemployment beneﬁts linked to their past earnings (and their past skills) and receive
wage oﬀers linked to their current skills. More rapid skill depreciation worsens the value of
the average wage oﬀer compared to the value of unemployment and increases unemployment
duration. This model has a ﬁxed wage distribution and ﬁxed number of jobs; thus, the
26In virtually all OECD economies, ﬁring costs are proportional to the wage at separation, so we model
T =( r − γ)U · t.W eh a v ev e r i ﬁed that this choice has no impact on the results. The other parameters of
the model are unchanged with respect to the benchmark calibration. In particular, we set b =0 .05.




















   
Figure 6: The response of the labor income share to a rise in the rate of embodied technical
change γ in the vintage-capital model when economies diﬀer with respect to the ﬁring tax t.
mechanism operates entirely on the labor supply side. In our model, in contrast, workers
accept every job oﬀer, but both wages and labor demand (i.e., the number of jobs) are
endogenous. In this sense, the two papers highlight the importance of the complementarity
between technological shocks and welfare beneﬁts along two parallel margins: labor supply
and labor demand.
Blanchard and Wolfers (1999) attribute unemployment diﬀerentials across countries and
over time in a panel of OECD countries to the interaction between shocks and labor market
policies. They consider three types of shocks–a productivity growth slowdown, a rise in
the interest rate, and technological change biased against labor–together with several types
of policies, including unemployment insurance and employment protection legislation. Our
embodied productivity acceleration can be interpreted as the source of technological change
biased against labor, measured by Blanchard and Wolfers directly oﬀ the fall in the labor
share. The authors ﬁnd signiﬁcant evidence of interactions between shocks and institutions:
in line with our ﬁndings, they report that a shock that increases unemployment by 1% in the
country with the lowest welfare beneﬁts would have an impact 5 times larger in the country
40with the most generous welfare payments, whereas this “multiplier” eﬀect for employment
protection legislation is only 2.27 Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1999) also study the evolution
of the labor share across OECD countries since 1970. They ﬁnd that in the presence of
institutions that promote wage rigidity, shocks that reduce employment signiﬁcantly also
reduce the labor share of income. One can view our quantitative study as the “structural”
counterpart of these empirical analyses.
In a recent paper, den Haan, Haefke, and Ramey (2001) study the quantitative implica-
tions of interest-rate and TFP shocks within a calibrated version of the traditional Mortensen
and Pissarides (1994) framework. In this class of models, a rise in the real interest rate or
af a l li nT F Ph a v ei d e n t i c a le ﬀects: the equilibrium unemployment rate increases through
ar i s ei nt h e“ e ﬀective discount factor,” as demonstrated already in Pissarides (1990). Like
us, den Haan et al. also ask if institutions can account for the diﬀerential response of labor
markets to these shocks. They ﬁnd that labor market institutions are important only if the
United States and Europe diﬀer substantially in their cross-sectional distributions of match-
speciﬁc productivities, a dimension of the data that the authors do not attempt to calibrate.
In our model economies, the eﬀects of an interest rate shock are negligible. Following an
interest rate hike, fewer jobs are created and unemployment duration rises, but at the same
time the destruction age increases, which reduces the separation rate (see Lemma 8). We
ﬁnd that the net eﬀect on unemployment is small and the policy-shock interactions are much
less pronounced than in our experiments. For example, as the real interest rate grows from
1 %p e ry e a rt o6 % ,t h ed i ﬀerential rise in the unemployment rate between the economy with
the highest beneﬁts and the economy with the lowest beneﬁts is only by 2%.28
Our paper relates to the argument advanced for example in Blanchard (1997) and Ca-
ballero and Hammour (1998) whereby European unemployment is largely due to expensive
labor services and a fall in labor demand associated to ﬁrms’ adoption of ever more labor-
saving technologies. Our model does not allow for any substitutability between capital and
labor at the level of the production unit, but some form of substitution takes place at the
aggregate level: as capital becomes cheaper and cheaper in eﬃciency units, the European
economy produces with more productive capital per worker and fewer workers.
27We reached this conclusion from their Table 1, where shocks are all bundled into a time eﬀect. An ideal
comparison with our model would be a measure of this institutional multiplier for their observable “labor
demand” shock, but this number is not directly available in the paper.
28In this experiment we set γ = 5% per year, the average of the period considered. All the other parameters
are unchanged.
41Last but not least, our approach has the advantage over virtually all of the existing lit-
erature that formalizes the U.S.—Europe comparison of being able to measure the source of
the shock independently, through capital-embodied productivity. Thus we do not calibrate
the source of the shock to the labor market equilibrium outcomes of interest, such as wage
inequality or labor share.29 As a result, the focus of the analysis is limited to the diﬀerent
unemployment experience of United States and Europe. We maintain the view that unem-
ployment, wage inequality and changes in the labor income share have been produced by
the same fundamental shock and should be explained jointly: they are all dimensions along
which the model needs to be evaluated rather than calibrated.
5.5 A comparison with the Aghion-Howitt/Mortensen-Pissarides
setup
In contrast to other search models with vintage capital (in particular, see Aghion and Howitt
1994, and Mortensen and Pissarides 1999) the pool of vacant ﬁrms in our model economies
is heterogenous. Vacancies are heterogeneous because of random matching and because the
bulk of the cost associated with creating a job is related to the purchase of the capital needed
in production. It is precisely this vacancy heterogeneity that contributes to the ampliﬁcation
of the eﬀects of shocks in our economies.
Traditional search-matching frameworks (e.g., Mortensen and Pissarides 1999) assume
that a new machine can be created at zero cost and that only posting a vacancy is costly.
This assumption implies that the pool of vacancies consists of the newest machines only,
and that only machines in existing matches age over time. In our setup we instead assume
that once a machine has been acquired at a cost, recruiting costs are “small compared to
29In Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) the skill depreciation shock is calibrated to the increase in U.S. earn-
ings instability. In Mortensen and Pissarides (1999a), the shock is a mean-preserving spread in the skill
distribution, calibrated to the increase in U.S. wage inequality. In Blanchard (1997), the main source of the
shock is the degree of technological bias in favor of capital (against labor) and is identiﬁed through changes
i nt h ec a p i t a ls h a r eo fi n c o m e . A tt h ee x t r e m eo ft h es pectrum the shock is completely unobservable. In
Marimon and Zilibotti (1999) the shock is an increase in the degree of mismatch between workers and jobs,
while Caballero and Hammour (1998) model an “appropriability” shock that changes the division of quasi-
rents between capital and labor. Because of the intrinsic unobservability of the shock, no attempt is made
to calibrate the shock in these two papers.
A recent exception is the paper by den Haan et al. (2001), where several candidates for the shock are
considered (the decline in total factor productivity and the rise in the real interest rate), all measured from
independent data. However, the authors focus on unemployment and do not examine the dynamics of wage
inequality or income shares.
42that cost” (zero in our model).30 This explicit distinction between a “large” purchase/setup
cost for the machine — which is sunk when the vacant ﬁrm start searching— and a “smaller”
recruiting cost ﬁts naturally with a vintage capital growth model, whose emphasis is on
capital investment expenditures as a way of improving productivity. Aghion and Howitt
(1994) also describe a vintage capital model with large setup costs for capital, but they
assume that matching is “deterministic”: a tt h et i m ean e wm a c h i n ei ss e tu p ,aw o r k e r
queues up for the machine, and after a ﬁxed amount of time the worker and ﬁrm start
operations. Hence, in the matching process, all vacant ﬁrms are equal (although they do not
embody the leading-edge technology).
The equilibrium of the Mortensen-Pissarides (MP) model is characterized by the following







γ(˜ a−a−¯ a))d˜ a, (27)
e
−γ¯ a = b + m(θ)βe S(0;¯ a), (JC00)
I = λf (1 − β) e S(0;¯ a). (JD00)
The cost I now represents a ﬂow search cost. Notice two diﬀerences between our setup and
the MP model. First, in the MP model old machines from an existing match are discarded
once the match dissolves. This means that there is no longer a non-zero outside option to the
ﬁrm, and the term (1 − β)λf is eliminated from the eﬀective discount factor in the surplus
function (27). Second, in the MP model workers always face the newest vintage in the pool
of vacancies. This means that in the job destruction condition (JD00), only the surplus of the
most recent vintage is relevant and not a weighted average of the surpluses across vintages.
The qualitative comparative statics of the MP model with respect to b and γ are the
same as in our model, but there are important quantitative diﬀerences. Compared to the
MP model, the just mentioned diﬀerences between (JC,JD)a n d( JC00,JD 00)d a m p e nt h e
positive eﬀect of a rise in γ on the right-hand sides of JC00 and JD00 in our setup for
two reasons. First, as discussed in Section 4.1, the equilibrium density of vacancies shifts
towards older machines and for suﬃciently old matches the surplus declines with the rate of
embodied technological change. Second, from (14), it is clear that the larger discount factor
weakens the eﬀect of γ on the surplus. In conclusion, a given rise in γ increases the value
30At the risk of being redundant, let us restate that vacancy heterogeneity will survive the addition of a
ﬂow search cost c,a sl o n ga st h i sc o s ti ss t r i c t l yl e s st h a nt h ei n i t i a ls e t - u pc o s tI.
43of vacant ﬁrms and the value of search in the standard model by a larger amount, which
implies ampler downward shifts of the two curves and a larger reduction of ¯ a.T h u s , t h e
Mortensen-Pissarides economy responds to shocks mainly through the incidence margin and
not through the duration margin.
We now turn to wage inequality and the income shares. In the MP model the ratio of the
highest to the lowest wage is w(0)/w(¯ a)=( 1− β)+βeγ¯ a; thus, changes to wage inequality
induced by a rise in γ will only take place through the technological heterogeneity channel.
In relation to the labor share, since the Mortensen-Pissarides economy responds to the shock
mainly through the incidence margin, that is, through a large reduction in the destruction
age ¯ a rather than a rise in unemployment duration, it will have a smaller change in the labor
share, as explained in Section 4.3. Finally, note the absence of any eﬀect due to the ﬁrms’
outside option both for inequality and for the labor share, contrary to what we found in
Section 4.2. These eﬀects, which originate precisely from the vacancy heterogeneity, play an
important role in the quantitative analysis above.
Figure 7 shows that the MP model displays a weak interaction between changes in the
rate of embodied technological change γ and beneﬁts, for empirically plausible values of b
(until b =0 .6).31 Unemployment duration barely responds to a change in the growth rate
γ, whereas the life-length of capital is reduced substantially, and in fact the separation rate
i n c r e a s e sm u c hm o r et h a ni nt h eb a s e l i n ee c o nomy. The only case where an interaction is
evident is for b =0 .7, the extreme parametrization. However, the signiﬁcant rise in unem-
ployment (4 points) is still well below its data counterpart. Moreover, as anticipated this
rise takes place along the “wrong” margin: it is unemployment incidence that increases by
8%, while duration goes up by a small amount (only 5 weeks). Wage inequality increases by
less than 0.5% in U.S.-type economies and is essentially constant in Europe-type economies.
In particular, the absence of the ﬁrm’s outside option eﬀect prevents inequality from falling
in high b economies. Finally, the reductioni nt h el a b o rs h a r ei si n s i g n i ﬁc a n t ,i nb o t hl o w -
and high-beneﬁts economies.
31We have tried to calibrate the MP model to the same set of moments we selected for our economy in
Section 5. In the process we have found that the MP model cannot match the average age of capital in
the data. It can generate at most an average age of capital equal to 7.5 years conditionally on matching all
the other moments. We let γ vary in the same range, while we change the values of b to generate similar
beneﬁts-wage ratio as in the baseline experiment. The value b =0 .10 implies a beneﬁts-wage ratio of 15%,
b =0 .4 of 50%, b =0 .6 of 80% and b =0 .7 of 90%. The case b =0 .7 is not empirically plausible, but it
is useful to interpret the results. The other model parameters are set as follows: r =0 .017,δ=0 .061,β =
0.1,α=0 .55,I=2 .7, and A is normalized to 1.
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Figure 7: The eﬀects of a rise in the rate of embodied technical change γ in the standard
Mortensen-Pissarides model, when the economies diﬀer only via the level of welfare beneﬁts
b.
456 Concluding remarks
The past twenty years have been marked by very rapid capital-embodied growth. In this
paper, we have made an attempt to understand how the beneﬁts of this type of technological
change are shared among labor market players: who are the winners and the losers when
the relative productivity of new capital increases? In a generalized version of the standard
vintage capital model with labor market frictions, we showed qualitatively that the answer
depends crucially on the institutions and policies of the economy considered. With European-
style generous welfare beneﬁts, faster technical change reduces the wage inequalities among
employed workers. It magniﬁes the diﬀerences between employed and unemployed workers,
as unemployment duration rises substantially with little change in job tenures, and it shrinks
the share of income going to labor earners, more strongly so where employment protection
legislation is particularly strict.
Quantitatively, the model suggests (i) that embodied technical change accounts for a small
but signiﬁcant part of wage inequality, and (ii) thata na c c e l e r a t i o no fe m b o d i e dt e c h n i c a l
change together with diﬀerent labor market policies can account for the diﬀerential labor
market outcomes in continental Europe and the United States. Given the absence of studies
on the impact of vintage eﬀects on wage diﬀerentials, we have not calibrated the model
along this dimension, but rather we have used it to obtain an estimate of this elasticity. The
calibrated model suggests that embodied technical change accounts for one fourth of residual
wage inequality in the United States. The calibrated model is also successful in generating
the diﬀerential rise in unemployment between the United States and Europe following an
acceleration of technological change. When ﬁring costs are embedded, the model can also
match the diﬀerential fall in the labor share, but it tends to overstate the fall in the U.S.
labor share. An acceleration in the rate of embodied technical progress leads to a small
increase in wage inequality in the U.S.-like economy and to a small fall in the Europe-like
economy with generous welfare beneﬁts.
We conjecture that the two main shortcomings of the quantitative analysis (too low a rise
in inequality and too rapid a decline in the labor share in U.S.-type economies) result mainly
from the simplifying assumption that workers are ex ante equal. In Hornstein, Krusell, and
Violante (2002), we extend our environment to two skill levels. In particular, we investigate
whether such a model can generate much larger increases in wage inequality and a stable
46labor share. Accounting for diﬀerences in ex ante labor quality might be important, because
in the United States the fall in the wage bill for unskilled workers seems to have been
accompanied by a rise in the demand for skilled workers and in their labor share.
Finally, we have compared our generalized version of the model to the standard version
with a trivial equilibrium distribution of vacancies to show that vacancy heterogeneity is an
important driving force behind the results. In the process, we realized that the standard
model predicts no change in labor shares. Although this is a shortcoming of the standard
model, recall that our model fails in the opposite direction since it generates too large a fall
in the U.S. labor share. A useful lesson that can be learned from the comparison of the two
models is that the larger is the initial set-up cost I, the steeper is the decline in the labor
share as γ rises. One could perhaps argue that certain policy diﬀerences between the U.S.
and Europe that aﬀect I (e.g., red tape associated with starting new businesses) can also
help explaining the diﬀerential evolution of the labor shares.
47Appendix
A.1 In the frictionless economy the competitive equilibrium allocation and the
Pareto-optimal allocations are the same.
The planner maximizes the discounted value of future consumption, i.e., output net of in-
vestment, subject to the constraint that the total number of machines in operation in each
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ef(t − a)da ≤ 1, for all t.
The planner chooses the measure of entrants ef(t)o fv i n t a g et and the maximal age ¯ a(t)o f
vintages which are operating at t. Since there are no frictions, the planner can use arbitrary
ﬁrm measures of any vintage, and since more recent vintages are more productive, the planner
uses all ﬁrms of the most recent vintages ﬁrst. At time t the planner operates vintages in
[t − ¯ a(t),t] . We can write the Lagrangian for the constrained optimization problem in


























where ϕ(t) is the Lagrange multiplier on the labor endowment constraint and ˆ a(t) ≡
¯ a[t − ˆ a(t)] denotes the age at which a vintage t machine is retired. The ﬁrst order con-












γˆ a(t)ϕ[t +ˆ a(t)]
ª
=0 .
The ﬁrst condition states that the planner will add new ﬁrms until the beneﬁts (present value
of additional output) equal the direct installation costs and the indirect costs. This could
follow from the fact that the creation of new ﬁrms requires the destruction of others, given
the ﬁxed amount of labor available. The second condition states that a marginal increase
48in the destruction age raises the expected output of existing ﬁrms but once again requires a
reduction in the total number of operating ﬁrms.
In steady state, the time subscripts can be omitted and ˆ a =¯ a. Moreover, we can impose
the condition ef =1 /¯ a which guarantees that the distribution is stationary and all the labor
is employed. From the second condition, we obtain that ϕ = e−γa. This expression is easily
interpretable: ϕ is the multiplier on the total labor force constraint, and e−γa is exactly the
value of slackening this constraint, i.e., the marginal contribution of an extra unit of labor










which is the key equilibrium condition (2) in the decentralized economy.
A.2 Derivations of value functions and employment distributions.
The value functions and distributions of our continuous-time model can be derived as limits
of a discrete time formulation. A typical derivation of the diﬀerential equations for value
functions (5)-(8) goes as follows. Consider the value of a vacant ﬁrm with capital of age a at
time t, ˜ V (t,a). For a Poisson matching process, the probability that the vacant ﬁrm meets




˜ J(t + ∆,a+ ∆) − ˜ V (t + ∆,a+ ∆)
i
+ e
−r∆˜ V (t + ∆,a+ ∆),
where the ﬁrst term is the expected capital gain from becoming a matched ﬁrm with value
˜ J and the second term is the present value of remaining vacant at the end of the time
interval. On a balanced growth path all value functions increase at the rate γ over time,
i.e., ˜ V (t,a)=eγtV (a)a n d ˜ J (t,a)=eγtJ (a). Subtracting ˜ V (t + ∆,a)f r o mb o t hs i d e s ,
substituting the balanced growth path expressions for ˜ V and ˜ J, and dividing by ∆eγ(t+∆),





= λf [J(a + ∆) − V (a + ∆)] +
e−r∆ − 1
∆
V (a + ∆)
+
V (a + ∆) − V (a)
∆
.
As we shorten the length of the time interval and take the limit for ∆ → 0, we obtain the
diﬀerential equation (5):
−γV(a)=λf [J(a) − V (a)] − rV(a)+V
0(a).
49The equations describing employment dynamics are derived as follows. Consider the
measure of matched vintage a ﬁrms at time t.O v e ras h o r tt i m ei n t e r v a lo fl e n g t h∆,t h e
approximate change in the measure is
µ(t + ∆,a)=µ(t,a − ∆)(1 − ∆δ)+∆λfν(t,a − ∆).
Subtracting µ(t,a) from both sides and dividing by ∆ we obtain
µ(t + ∆,a) − µ(t,a)
∆
= −
µ(t,a) − µ(t,a − ∆)
∆
− δµ(t,a − ∆)+λfν(t,a − ∆).
Taking the limit for ∆ → 0o n eo b t a i n s
µt(t,a)=−µa(t,a) − δµ(t,a)+λfν(t,a).
At steady state, these measures do not change with t, and we obtain the result stated in
(16).
Similarly, the diﬀerential equation for unemployment can be derived as follows. Over a














µ(t,¯ a − x)dx
The ﬁrst two terms on the right-hand side are standard: they are ﬂows assuming a Pois-
son process and these ﬂows are approximately linear in the length of the interval, since
the interval is small. The third term sums all those matches that will reach ¯ a by the end
of the period and therefore separate. Subtracting u(t) on both sides, dividing by ∆,t a k -
ing limits as ∆ approaches 0, and assuming steady state yields the result (21). To ﬁnd
lim∆→0
hR ∆
0 µ(¯ a − x)dx
i
/∆, use l’Hˆ opital’s rule.






























50Integrating both sides of the equation ν(a)+µ(a)=ν( 0 )o v e rt h es u p p o r t[ 0 ,a), we conclude
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−(δ+λf)¯ a − 1
δ+λf
´




−(δ+λf)¯ a − 1
δ+λf
´. (32)
Having found the unemployment rate u, the entry of ﬁrms ν(0) is simply found from equation
(31), using the fact that µ =1−u. Equations (17) and (18) in the main text can be derived
simply using (28) together with (31) and (29) together with (30), respectively.
A.3 Proof of Lemmas 1,2,3 (the job creation curve).
Lemma 1 (the downward sloping (JC) curve): The (JC) curve is implicitly deﬁned by
the equation




−(r−γ)aS (a;¯ a,λf,γ)da. (JC)
We show that the RHS of this expression is increasing in ¯ a and λf, which implies that the
(JC) curve is downward sloping in the (λf,¯ a)s p a c e .










with σ0 = r + δ +( 1− β)λf and σ1 = σ0 − γ. It is immediate that the surplus function is
decreasing in a and increasing in ¯ a. Since the surplus function is increasing in the exit age
¯ a, it is immediate that the RHS of (JC) is increasing in the exit age ¯ a.
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with ρ = r − γ + δ and ˆ λf =( 1− β)λf. We now show that the integral of the function
f (˜ a;λf)=λfe
−(ρ+λf)˜ a with respect to the weighting function g(˜ a)=eγ(¯ a−a−˜ a)−1i si n c r e a s -
ing in λf.T h ef u n c t i o nf is increasing (decreasing) with respect to λf for ˜ a<(>)ˆ a =1 /λf.
51The integral of the function f, however, is increasing with λf, as
Z ¯ a
0



















−(ρ+λf)¯ a > 0.
The integral of f with respect to g is also increasing with λf, since the weighting function g
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fλf (˜ a;λf)d˜ a>0,
with a+ =m i n{ˆ a,¯ a − a}.




r + δ +( 1− β)λf
(35)
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Taking the limit of expression (35) as λf →∞ ,w eg e t
I =
1 − e−r¯ amin
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− e












where ¯ aCE is the age cut-oﬀ of the frictionless economy, implicitly deﬁned by (2). Alterna-


















A.4 Proof of Lemmas 4 and 5 (the job destruction curve).
52Lemma 4 (the upward-sloping (JD) curve): The (JD) curve is implicitly deﬁned by
the equation
1=be




γ¯ aS(a;¯ a,λf,γ)da. (JD)
We show that the RHS of this expression is increasing in ¯ a and decreasing in λf,w h i c h
implies that the (JD) curve is upward-sloping in (λf,¯ a)s p a c e .
(4a) The RHS of (JD) is increasing in ¯ a: The ﬁrst term is clearly increasing in ¯ a.N o w
take the derivative of the function to be integrated in the second term, and express it in
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Thus the ﬁrst term in (36) is negative, but its absolute value is less than one since e
−(δ+λf)a >
e
−(δ+λf)¯ a for a ≤ ¯ a. We will now show that the elasticity of the modiﬁed surplus function ˜ S
with respect to ¯ a is positive and greater than or equal to one. It will therefore follow that
the integral in (JD) is increasing in ¯ a.
We proceed in three steps. First, we show that the elasticity of ˜ S with respect to ¯ a is
increasing in a for a given ¯ a. That is, if the elasticity is greater than one at a =0 ,t h e ni ti s
greater than one for all a. Second, we show that for small enough ¯ a the elasticity is greater
o re q u a lt oz e r oa ta = 0; in particular, we show that lim¯ a→0
³





we show at a = 0 the elasticity is increasing in ¯ a. The three steps together imply that the
elasticity is greater or equal to one for all a ≤ ¯ a.







1 − H (¯ a − a)


















Since σ0 = r + δ +( 1− β)λf and by assumption r>γ ,t h ef u n c t i o nH is decreasing in x.
Therefore the elasticity is increasing in a.
53The limit of the elasticity at a =0a s¯ a converges to zero is greater or equal to one.










∂2 ˜ S/∂¯ a2
´
+ ∂ ˜ S/∂¯ a
∂ ˜ S/∂¯ a
= 1 + lim
¯ a→0
³
∂2 ˜ S/∂¯ a2
´
¯ a
∂ ˜ S/∂¯ a
≥ 1
since ∂ ˜ S/∂¯ a, ∂2 ˜ S/∂¯ a2 ≥ 0.
Finally we need to show that at a = 0, the elasticity is increasing in ¯ a,t h a ti sG(¯ a)=
¯ a/[1 − H (¯ a)] is increasing in ¯ a. First, multiply numerator and denominator by σ1(1−e−σ0¯ a).
This delivers
G(¯ a)=
σ1¯ a(1 − e−σ0¯ a)
σ1(1 − e−σ0¯ a) − σ0(1 − e−σ1¯ a)e−γ¯ a =¯ a
σ1(1 − e−σ0¯ a)
σ1 − σ0e−γ¯ a + γe−σ0¯ a.
Notice that the denominator of this expression is positive: at ¯ a =0 ,i te q u a l s0 ,a n d
its derivative equals γσ0(e−γ¯ a − e−σ0¯ a), which is positive because of the assumption that
γ<r<σ 0.F o rl a r g e¯ a, the expression is large: lim¯ a→∞ G(¯ a)=l i m ¯ a→∞ ¯ a = ∞.
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−¯ a
σ0e−σ0¯ a (σ1 − σ0e−γ¯ a + γe−σ0¯ a) − (1 − e−σ0¯ a)γσ0 (e−γ¯ a − e−σ0¯ a)
(σ1 − σ0e−γ¯ a + γe−σ0¯ a)
2
=
1 − e−σ0¯ a
σ1 − σ0e−γ¯ a + γe−σ0¯ a
−¯ aσ0
σ1e−σ0¯ a − σ0e−(γ+σ0)¯ a + γ
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e−2σ0¯ a − e−γ¯ a + e−σ0¯ a + e−(γ+σ0)¯ a − e−2σ0¯ a¢
(σ1 − σ0e−γ¯ a + γe−σ0¯ a)
2 .
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The left factor is larger than zero (it starts at zero and increases). After substituting for
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The ﬁrst of these two terms is positive, since σ0 >γby assumption. If we can show that
the second term is positive, we are done. That term has two sub-terms; we will prove that
their ratio exceeds one. The ratio reads
e−γ¯ a R ¯ a
0 e−σ0xdx








But since the weighting function e−(¯ a−x)γ is everywhere above the weighting function e−(¯ a−x)σ0,
again because σ0 >γ(and ¯ a>x ), and the rest of the integrand is positive, the ratio indeed
must exceed 1.
(4b) The RHS of (JD) is decreasing in λf for a Cobb-Douglas matching function
with α>1/2: We rewrite equation (JD) as
1=be








It is immediate that the two terms under the integral, the modiﬁed density λw and the
modiﬁed surplus function ˜ S, are decreasing in λf. Assuming a Cobb-Douglas matching




which is decreasing in λf for α>1/2.
Lemma 5 (The asymptote of the (JD) curve): For λf large, the density λw converges
to a uniform density on [0,¯ a], limλf→∞ λw (a)=
1
¯ a +1 /δ
, and the surplus function converges





55A.5 Proof of Lemma 6,7,8, and 9 (comparative statics).
Lemma 6 (b): Obvious from inspection of (JC) and (JD).
Lemma 7 (γ): The RHS of (JC) is increasing in the rate of embodied technical change γ,
because the function f (γ)=eγaS (a;¯ a,λf,γ)i si n c r e a s i n gi nγ. The derivative of f with


















≥ 0f o rx ≥ 0.
Since the RHS of (JC) is increasing γ and ¯ a, the (JC) curve shifts downward as γ increases.
The RHS of (JD) is increasing in the rate of embodied technical change γ because the























/σ0 ≥ 0f o rx ≥ 0.
Therefore ∂ ˜ S/∂γ ≥ 0 for all x ≥ 0. Since ˜ S is increasing in γ for all a ∈ [0,¯ a], the RHS of
(JD) is increasing in γ. Since the RHS of (JD) is increasing in γ and ¯ a,t h e( J D )c u r v es h i f t s
downward as γ increases.
Lemma 8 (r): Obvious from inspection of (JC) and (JD).
Lemma 9 (A): When the frictions disappear, both meeting probabilities tend to inﬁnity.
We proved above that as λf →∞ , the job creation condition converges to the competitive
condition (2). Consider now the wage equation (23). It is easy to compute that as λf →∞ ,
the term λf (1 − β)S(a) converges to e−γa−e−γ¯ a,i m p l y i n gw(a)=( 1−β)(r−γ)U+βe−γ¯ a =
e−γ¯ a, where the last equality follows from condition (13). Thus, the job destruction condition
converges to the competitive one as well, which proves the Lemma.
A.6 Solution of the model with the ﬁring tax.
56The value equations in the model with the ﬁring tax/hiring subsidy are:
(r − γ)V (a)=m a x {λf [T + J(a) − V (a)] + V
0(a),0}
(r − γ)J(a)=m a x {e
−γa − w(a) − δ[J(a) − V (a)+T]+J
0(a),(r − γ)[V (a) − T]}




(r − γ)W(a)=m a x {w(a) − δ[W(a) − U]+W
0(a),(r − γ)U},
where it is clear that the ﬁrm receives from the government the subsidy T upon hiring and
pays a tax of the same amount T upon separation. The total surplus S (a)o fat y p ea match
is now S (a) ≡ J (a)+W (a) − V (a) − U + T both for a new meeting and for an ongoing
relationship. The term T plays the role of the subsidy in the ﬁrst case, and the role of the
tax in the second case (with the subsidy being sunk): we can avoid the two-tier structure.
The surplus is split according to the Nash rule β[W(a)−U]=( 1−β)[T +J(a)−V (a)] and








−γa − (r − γ)(U − T)
¤
d˜ a, (37)
where the associated destruction rule for a match is (25) in the main text. Using the value
equation for the employed worker and the Nash rule, we arrive at the expression for the
wage function (26) in the main text. Using the Nash splitting rule into the equation for the
value of a vacancy and solving the associated diﬀerential equation yields exactly the same
job creation condition as in the benchmark model with the implication that the destruction
rule for a vacancy V (a) = 0 implies S(ˆ a;¯ a,λf)=0 ;t h u s ,ˆ a =¯ a. Using the value equation for
the unemployed worker into the destruction condition (25) yields the equilibrium condition
(JD’) in the main text. Finally, it is easy to see that the expressions for all the distributions
are unchanged.
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61Table 1: Cross-country labor market data
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 Change
 
Unemp. Rate 0.018 0.011 0.017 0.029 0.045 0.054 0.061 0.043
Austria Labor share 0.698 0.679 0.717 0.694 0.665 0.646 0.645 -0.053
Inequality 0.820 0.790 0.870 0.880 0.060
Unemp. Rate 0.023 0.022 0.064 0.114 0.111 0.110 0.142 0.120
Belgium Labor share   0.667 0.729 0.730 0.682 0.685 0.676 0.009
Inequality 0.660 0.650 0.640 -0.020
Unemp. Rate 0.014 0.016 0.061 0.093 0.085 0.112 0.103 0.089
Denmark Labor share 0.736 0.723 0.732 0.706 0.677 0.635 0.605 -0.131
Inequality 0.760 0.770 0.770 0.010
Unemp. Rate 0.025 0.021 0.050 0.051 0.047 0.121 0.167 0.142
Finland Labor share 0.738 0.711 0.762 0.730 0.723 0.733 0.680 -0.058
Inequality 0.890 0.920 0.940 0.930 0.040
Unemp. Rate 0.020 0.027 0.049 0.079 0.101 0.105 0.115 0.095
France Labor share 0.688 0.674 0.707 0.710 0.645 0.618 0.603 -0.085
Inequality 1.210 1.210 1.240 1.230 0.020
Unemp. Rate 0.010 0.011 0.037 0.060 0.075 0.078 0.099 0.089
Germany Labor share 0.685 0.703 0.703 0.704 0.667 0.658 0.637 -0.048
Inequality 0.870 0.830 0.830 0.810 -0.060
Unemp. Rate 0.019 0.025 0.044 0.089 0.091 0.086 0.079 0.060
Greece Labor share 0.693 0.699 0.698 0.694 0.690 0.712 0.692 -0.002
Inequality  
Unemp. Rate 0.047 0.055 0.078 0.112 0.164 0.146 0.120 0.073
Ireland Labor share 0.828 0.842 0.835 0.833 0.763 0.715 0.645 -0.183
Inequality
Unemp. Rate 0.041 0.043 0.051 0.070 0.099 0.096 0.120 0.079
Italy Labor share 0.669 0.687 0.711 0.690 0.656 0.653 0.606 -0.063
Inequality 0.850 0.830 0.770 0.970 0.120
Unemp. Rate 0.010 0.018 0.038 0.080 0.081 0.062 0.071 0.061
Netherlands Labor share 0.656 0.687 0.705 0.661 0.623 0.619 0.624 -0.032
Inequality 0.920 0.960 0.950 0.030
Unemp. Rate 0.016 0.015 0.018 0.026 0.030 0.056 0.049 0.034
Norway Labor share 0.750 0.771 0.782 0.757 0.739 0.713    -0.037
Inequality 0.720 0.720 0.680 -0.040
Unemp. Rate 0.040 0.024 0.065 0.079 0.070 0.051 0.073 0.033
Portugal Labor share 0.562 0.615 0.873 0.751 0.673 0.679 0.680 0.118
Inequality  
Unemp. Rate 0.028 0.030 0.059 0.161 0.200 0.196 0.230 0.202
Spain Labor share 0.763 0.780 0.788 0.756 0.679 0.669 0.616 -0.147
Inequality
Unemp. Rate 0.018 0.022 0.019 0.028 0.021 0.052 0.079 0.061
Sweden Labor share 0.724 0.716 0.745 0.711 0.691 0.693 0.630 -0.095
Inequality 0.750 0.760 0.730 0.790 0.040
Unemp. Rate 0.019 0.025 0.044 0.089 0.091 0.086 0.079 0.060
UK Labor share 0.693 0.699 0.698 0.694 0.690 0.712 0.692 -0.002
Inequality 0.920 1.050 1.150 1.200 0.280
Unemp. Rate 0.040 0.058 0.076 0.099 0.089 0.103 0.096 0.056
Canada Labor share 0.716 0.660 0.652 0.634 0.630 0.666 0.659 -0.057
Inequality 1.240 1.390 1.380 1.330 0.090
Unemp. Rate 0.038 0.054 0.070 0.083 0.062 0.066 0.055 0.017
USA Labor share 0.685 0.695 0.675 0.678 0.665 0.666 0.670 -0.015
Inequality 1.180 1.350 1.380 1.470 0.290
Europe Unemp. Rate 0.023 0.024 0.046 0.077 0.087 0.095 0.108 0.084
Average Labor share 0.707 0.711 0.749 0.723 0.684 0.673 0.641 -0.058
  Inequality       0.859 0.841 0.844 0.900 0.040
Note: Data on unemployment rates are from Blanchard and Wolfers (2000). Data on labor 
shares are from Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) except the 1995 entry for Austria, Denmark, 
Ireland and Portugal which was computed directly from OECD data. Inequality is measured 
as the 90-10 log-wage differential for male workers. The data are taken from the OECD 
Employment Outlook (1996, Table 3.1). Austria: the measure is the 80-10 differential and data 
in the 1985 column are for 1987. Belgium: the measure is the 80-10 differential and data 
in the 1995 column are for 1993. Denmark: 1985 and 1990 columns are for 1983 and 1991 respectively. 
Finland: data in the 1985 column are for 1986. Germany: data in the 1985 and 1995 columns 
are for 1983 and 1993 respectively. Italy:  data in the 1985, 1990 and 1995 columns are for 
1984, 1991 and 1993 respectively. Netherlands: the measure of inequality is for males 
and females. Norway: data in the 1985 and 1990 columns are for 1983 and 1991 respectively. 
Moreover, the measure of inequality is for males and females. Portugal: data in the 1990 and 1995 
columns are for 1989 and 1993 respectively. Canada: data in the 1980 and 1985 columns  
are for 1981 and 1986 respectively. For all countries, except US and UK, data in the 1995 
column are for 1994. Europe average: unweighted mean of European countries, except UK.